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THE INVENTION OF LOW-VALUE SPEECH
Genevieve Lakier*
It is widely accepted today that the First Amendment does not apply, or
applies only weakly, to what are often referred to as “low-value” categories of
speech. It is also widely accepted that the existence of these categories extends
back to the ratification of the First Amendment: that low-value speech is speech
the punishment of which has, since 1791, never been thought to raise any
constitutional concern.
This Article challenges this second assumption. It argues that early
American courts and legislators did not in fact tie constitutional protection for
speech to a categorical judgment of its value, nor did the punishment of lowvalue speech raise no constitutional concern. Instead, all speech—even lowvalue speech—was protected against prior restraint, and almost all speech—
even high-value speech—was subject to criminal punishment when it appeared
to pose a threat to the public order of society, broadly defined. It was only after
the New Deal Court embraced the modern, libertarian conception of freedom of
speech that courts began to treat high and low-value speech qualitatively
differently. By limiting the protection extended to low-value speech, the New
Deal Court attempted to reconcile the democratic values that the new conception
of freedom of speech was intended to further with the other values (order,
civility, public morality) that the regulation of speech had traditionally
advanced. Nevertheless, in doing so, the Court found itself in the difficult
position of having to judge the value of speech even though this was something
that was in principle anathema to the modern jurisprudence. It was to resolve
this tension that the Court asserted—on the basis of almost no evidence—that
the low-value categories had always existed beyond the scope of constitutional
concern.
By challenging the accuracy of the historical claims that the Court has used
to justify the doctrine of low-value speech, this Article forces a reexamination of
the basis for granting or denying speech full First Amendment protection. In so
doing, it challenges the Court’s recent claim that the only content-based
regulations of speech that are generally permissible under the First Amendment
are those that target speech that was historically unprotected. What the history
of the doctrine of low-value speech makes clear is that history has never served
as the primary basis for determining when First Amendment protections apply.
Nor should it today, given the tremendous changes that have taken place over
the past two centuries in how courts understand what it means to guarantee
freedom of speech, and to what kinds of expression the guarantee applies.
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INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted today that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech does not apply—or applies only weakly—to “low-value” categories of
speech such as obscenity and libel. It is also widely accepted today that the
existence of these categories extends back to the ratification of the First
Amendment: that low-value speech is speech that since 1791 has been considered
unworthy of constitutional protection, or at least, the protection afforded “highvalue” speech.
This Article challenges this second assumption. It argues that eighteenth and
nineteenth century courts did not in fact consider low-value speech to be
categorically unworthy of constitutional protection. Nor did they treat low-value
speech qualitatively differently than they treated other kinds of speech. It was only
in the New Deal period that courts began to link constitutional protection to a
judgment of the value of different kinds of speech.
As this Article shows, the idea that the low-value categories of speech have
always existed, and always existed beyond the scope of constitutional concern, is a
historical myth—one that the New Deal Court invented in order to justify what was
in fact a very new understanding of freedom of speech, and its limits. This myth
continues to hold considerable sway over First Amendment doctrine today. Indeed,
as recently as 2010, the Supreme Court insisted in United States v. Stevens that First
Amendment protections extend equally to all speech and expression except those
2

“well defined and narrowly limited classes” of low-value speech, “the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”1 As a result, the Court held, the only content-based regulations of speech
that are ordinarily permissible under the First Amendment today are those that
target one of these historically-determined low-value categories.2
By examining how courts have in the past treated the categories of what today
we consider to be low-value speech, this Article challenges the Court’s assertion in
Stevens and other recent cases that the boundaries of the First Amendment are, and
have always been, fixed by history. It demonstrates instead the tremendous changes
that have taken place over the past two centuries in the judicial understanding of
freedom of speech and the scope of its application. It also examines the normative
implications of this history. It argues that, given the significant changes in how
courts have understood what it means to guarantee freedom of speech, history does
not provide a principled basis for determining the scope of constitutional protection
today—or at least, it cannot do so without entailing a massive, and unappealing,
reorganization of the First Amendment boundaries as they currently exist.
In excavating the lost history of low-value speech, the Article not only
contributes to our understanding of the First Amendment’s past. It has significant
implications for its present and future as well. Specifically, it challenges the merits
of the Court’s holding in Stevens that, to establish the existence of a novel category
of low-value speech, what is required is historical evidence of a “long-settled
tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation.”3 The Stevens Court argued that,
by requiring evidence of this sort to identify novel categories of low-value speech,
it ensured fidelity to an original understanding of freedom of speech and prevented
judges from denying protection to speech merely because they disliked it. What the
history detailed in this Article makes clear, however, is that the test accomplishes
neither of these goals. What it does do is impose a very steep bar on the
government’s ability to regulate speech in new ways without receiving any clear
benefit in return. These problems with the Stevens test suggest that the Court should
instead embrace—and embrace more affirmatively than it has done so far—the
purpose-driven and functionalist, rather than historical, nature of the distinction
between high and low-value speech.
The Article also contributes to a surprisingly sparse literature exploring the
history of First Amendment boundaries. For much of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, there has been heated normative debate—both within the academy and
at times outside it—about what kinds of expressive activity should or should not be
considered “speech” for First Amendment purposes. Yet scholars have devoted
little attention to describing, let alone analyzing, the principles courts actually use

1

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72)).
2
Id. at 468. Content-based regulations are laws that restrict speech because of its message or
subject-matter. Content-neutral laws, in contrast, are laws that regulate when and how speech may
occur. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 189-90 (1983)
3
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
3

to determine what counts as speech for constitutional purposes.4 By examining how
courts have historically treated low-value speech, this Article contributes to our
rather rudimentary understanding of the principles that determine, and have
historically determined, the scope and nature of constitutional protection for
speech. In so doing, it illuminates two important shifts in the Court’s approach to
questions of constitutional coverage—one that took place in the New Deal period,
the second of which appears to be taking place today.5
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the historical and
methodological claims the Court has used to justify the doctrine of low-value
speech.
Part II explores the eighteenth and nineteenth-century case law dealing with
questions of freedom of speech. It argues that eighteenth and nineteenth century
courts employed what we might call a broad but shallow conception of freedom of
speech and press. That is, they recognized that even indecent or obscene speech
was covered by the constitutional guarantees of speech or press freedom insofar as
it could not be restrained in advance. But they did not hesitate to impose criminal
punishment, and in some cases civil liability, on these as well as many other kinds
of speech when they appeared to pose a threat to the public order, understood in
moral and social as well as political terms. In this respect, there was little qualitative
difference in how courts treated what later would be recognized as high and lowvalue speech.
Part III examines why it was that the New Deal Court turned to history to justify
what was in fact the novel distinction it drew between high and low-value speech.
It argues that it did so in order to mitigate tensions created by its embrace of a much
more libertarian conception of freedom of speech than it had previously employed.
This new conception of freedom of speech imposed much greater constraints on the
government’s ability to regulate speech not only when it expressed dissident or
subversive political views but when it violated dominant norms of public behavior.
In order to preserve the government’s ability to maintain basic standards of conduct
in public, the New Deal Court identified certain categories of low-value speech to
which the ordinary constitutional rules did not apply. Nevertheless, in limiting the
scope of First Amendment protection in this way, the Court found itself in the
difficult position of having to make first-order judgments about the value of
different kinds of speech even though this was something that was fundamentally
4
As Frederick Schauer noted in 2004, although “questions about the involvement of the First
Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding
the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech to which it applies, . . . the
question whether the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too
often simply assumed.” Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004)
5
Although several scholars have noted the shift in the Court’s approach to questions of First
Amendment coverage signaled by the Stevens decision, none has provided it sustained attention.
See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-Defining
Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (2012); Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two
Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67 (2010); R.
George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759
(2012); Ronald K.L. Collin, Exceptional Freedom: The Roberts Court, the First Amendment and
the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 424 (2012).
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anathema to the modern jurisprudence. It was in this context that the Court
asserted—on the basis of almost no evidence—that the low-value categories had
always existed beyond the scope of constitutional concern. Nevertheless, in these
and subsequent cases, the Court relied very little on history to identify the boundary
line between high and low-value speech.
Part IV examines the contemporary fate of the doctrine of low-value speech. It
argues that in recent years, the Court has essentially reinvented the doctrine of lowvalue speech by insisting—as earlier cases did not—that the only content-based
regulations that do not infringe freedom of speech are those that target categories
of speech that were subject to criminal sanctions in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In so doing, the Court has transformed the doctrine from a mechanism
for limiting constitutional protection for speech into a mechanism for expanding it.
It has also given historical arguments only a greater doctrinal importance than they
possessed before.
This Part argues that the Court’s new test of constitutional boundaries is deeply
problematic not only because it relies on a false view of the First Amendment’s
past but because it creates as a result a test of constitutional boundaries that
threatens to both overprotect and unprotect speech when considered in light of the
purposes the First Amendment is intended to advance. The significant problems
with the Stevens test demonstrate the difficulties created by the Court’s efforts to
link the contemporary boundaries of the First Amendment to the past. These
problems suggest that First Amendment doctrine would be better served by a
purpose-based test of constitutional boundaries. History can help elucidate what
those purposes are. Nevertheless, given the tremendous changes that have taken
place in how courts understand the means by which those purposes are to be
realized, history cannot determine the range of expressive activities to which the
guarantee of freedom of speech applies.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF LOW-VALUE SPEECH

Much of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is organized around a two-tier
structure that in practice has devolved into more than two tiers. At least when it
comes to the review of content-based regulations of speech, the degree of
constitutional scrutiny afforded the regulation will primarily depend on whether the
speech it targets is found to be high-value or low.6 Content-based regulations of
high-value speech are considered presumptively invalid.7 As a result, they will
survive constitutional scrutiny only if they can be shown to be narrowly tailored to
a compelling governmental purpose. Regulations that target low-value speech, in
contrast, must satisfy a much less demanding standard of review.
The Court has vacillated on precisely how much constitutional scrutiny the
content-based regulation of low-value speech should receive. Initially, it suggested
6
Other factors can intrude and complicate the two-tier analysis. Content-based regulations of
speech in schools and prisons, for example, receive less constitutional scrutiny than content-based
regulations of speech that takes place in public. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For purposes of this Article, I ignore
the complexities these non-subject-matter distinctions create.
7
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992)
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that low-value speech was entitled to no constitutional protection whatsoever. 8 It
has subsequently held that certain categories of low-value speech—such as
commercial advertising—are entitled to an intermediate level of constitutional
review.9 Other low-value categories, such as obscenity, continue to receive in
theory no constitutional protection whatsoever, even if a great deal of constitutional
labor may be expended determining whether a particular regulation targets obscene
speech, or instead merely pornographic or sexually-explicit speech.10 In general,
however, what unites the low-value categories is the fact that they can be regulated
on the basis of their content without having to satisfy strict scrutiny.11
As in other areas of law, the two-tier structure that organizes much of
contemporary First Amendment law helps reconcile the constitutional promise of
expressive freedom, defined in opposition to the government, with the practical
need for governmental regulation. It helps justify the government’s power to ban
not only obscenity and in some contexts profanity,12 but also its power to regulate
advertising, to prohibit “true threats,” and to sanction speech that is integral to
criminal activity but that does not itself pose the kind of imminent and serious threat
of harm to person or property that has generally been required to prosecute highvalue speech.13 The doctrine thus provides an important mechanism by which
courts ensure the workability of the First Amendment by cabining, but only in
limited circumstances, the libertarian breadth of its command.

8
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (concluding that obscenity is “outside the
protection intended for speech and press”); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)
(concluding that libel is “not . . . within the area of constitutionally protected speech” and therefore
no constitutional protections apply).
9
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 56466 (1980).
10
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect’,
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 724 (1978) (“Once it is demonstrated that a book or film fits within the
definition of obscenity . . . the prosecution’s task is complete; there need be no showing of any ‘clear
or present danger’ or imminent lawless activity”).
11
As the doctrine has developed, there are a number of kinds of speech that are not considered
low-value but are nevertheless regulated on the basis of their content without triggering strict
scrutiny. See infra notes _ - _, and accompanying text. Low-value speech is not therefore the only
speech that can be regulated on the basis of its content without triggering strict scrutiny. But the fact
that it may be regulated in this manner is what unites the otherwise extremely disparate category as
a whole.
12
Although profanity is generally not subject to content-based restrictions, the Court has upheld
the content-based restrictions on profanity in broadcast media. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
13
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (recognizing that
constitutional protection does not extend to speech integral to crime); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 763-764 (1982) (recognizing the same of child pornography); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388
(recognizing the same of “true threats”). True threats are “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or a group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).The category as
such does not include threatening language that operates as political hyperbole, or threats that are
not made seriously. It includes more, however, than simply language that poses a clear and present
danger of harm. As the Court made clear in Virginia v. Black, language can be prosecuted as a true
threat even when the speaker does not actually intend to carry out the threat. Id. at 360.
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This cabining is not unproblematic, however. By allowing courts and legislators
to treat speech found to possess less constitutional value differently than they treat
other kinds of more constitutionally valuable speech, the doctrine of low-value
speech violates a central principle of the modern First Amendment: namely, the
principle of content-neutrality, or the idea that, as Justice Marshall famously put it,
in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, “above all else, [what] the First
Amendment means [is] that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 14 The principle is
motivated by the belief that allowing the government to restrict speech on the basis
of its content threatens both democracy (by allowing the government to repress the
speech of those groups it dislikes or who criticize it) and social progress (by
allowing the government to remove ideas from competition in the public
marketplace).15 It also, of course, inhibits individual self-expression by telling
citizens what they can and cannot say.16
By granting less or no protection to low-value speech, the doctrine of low-value
speech allows the government to do what it is not supposed to be able to do: that is,
it allows the government to remove ideas it dislikes from public circulation in the
marketplace and potentially (though less easily) repress the speech of those who
criticize it.17 It also, of course, allows the government to absolutely prohibit its
citizens from expressing themselves in certain ways—by, for example, speaking of
sex in a prurient manner, or using threatening speech.
For this reason, it has been a persistent source of controversy and contention.
Indeed, a number of the most prominent First Amendment theorists of the twentieth
century have argued quite strenuously that the distinction between high and lowvalue speech is, as Thomas Emerson put it, “inconsistent with the basic theory of
the First Amendment” because it “necessarily involves the Court in the . . . task of
assigning relative values to different classes of expression.”18 Instead, these

14

Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Id. at 198-99.
16
Stone, supra note _ at 198.
17
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court made clear that the government could not use low-value
speech to enact viewpoint discrimination: that is, it could not use the low-value exceptions to target
particular speakers or viewpoints when the targeting of those viewpoints was not the justification
for the low-value category as a whole. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384 (“Our cases surely do not establish
the proposition that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular
instances of such proscribable expression . . . . That would mean that a city council could enact an
ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government
or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city government.”).This lessens the possibility
that the doctrine enacts forbidden repression although it does not entirely eliminate it. For more
discussion see infra notes _-_, and accompanying text.
18
THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 326 (1970). Kenneth Karst
argued similarly that the doctrine was inconsistent with the principle of equal liberty of expression”
that underpinned the First Amendment presumption against “governmental control of the content of
speech.” Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 31 (1976). See also Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989);
Kalven, supra note _ at 19 (noting that the “fundamental difficulty of the two-value theory [of lowvalue speech]” is that it requires courts to “weigh[] the social utility of speech” and this was
something “[t]he First Amendment . . . was designed to prevent.”).
15
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theorists argue, the same degree of constitutional protection should apply to all
speech.19
The Court has not agreed—although it has in some cases defined the low-value
categories of speech extremely narrowly, thereby limiting the range of cases in
which the distinction between high and low-value speech makes a meaningful
difference.20 It has instead attempted to mitigate the conflict between the principle
of content-neutrality and the doctrine of low-value speech by emphasizing the
historical origins of the low-value categories.
The Court’s emphasis on the historical origins of the low-value categories can
be traced back to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the 1942 decision in which the
Court first explicitly identified the existence of low-value categories of speech.21
The case involved a First Amendment challenge to the conviction of a Jehovah’s
Witness who was prosecuted for using “offensive, derisive, or annoying word[s]”
in public after he told the city marshal—who was at the time hauling him off to jail
to prevent his proselytizing from causing a riot—that he was a “God damned
racketeer” and “a damned Fascist.”22 The Court affirmed the conviction without
inquiring whether it satisfied the clear and present danger test it had recently begun
to apply in other cases involving the criminal prosecution of speech because it
found that the defendant’s language constituted “fighting words” and these were
one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”23 The Court went on to explain that fighting words, like the “lewd and
obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous” were traditionally denied constitutional
protection because of their lack of what it described as “social value.”24 It was this
language from the opinion that would be most frequently cited in subsequent years.
Nevertheless, the text of the opinion suggests that what distinguished fighting
words, as well as obscene, profane, and libelous speech, from “high-value” speech
was not their lack of social value per se but the historical fact that their contentbased regulation had never been thought to raise any constitutional concern.
Subsequent decisions similarly emphasized the historical origins of the lowvalue categories. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, for example, the Court held explicitly
what the Chaplinsky Court only suggested in dicta: namely, that libel was “not . . .
within the area of constitutionally protected speech.”25 It justified this conclusion
by pointing to the historical evidence that “[l]ibel of an individual was a commonlaw crime and thus criminal in the colonies” and that, in the aftermath of the
Revolution, “nowhere was there any suggestion that the crime of libel be
abolished.”26 Five years later, in Roth, the Court similarly concluded that obscenity
“was outside the protection intended for speech and press” because at the time of
19

See, e.g., Karst, supra note _, at 31; Alexander, supra note _, at 554.
See infra, notes _ - _, and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court has narrowed
the scope of the low-value categories of obscenity, libel, profanity, and fighting words.
21
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 571-72.
24
Id. at 572.
25
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266.
26
Id. at 254-255.
20
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the adoption of the First Amendment it was prohibited in at least some states, and
subsequently recognized as a crime in many others.27
Although in the 1970s and 1980s, historical arguments played very little role in
the low-value speech cases, in recent years, the Court has emphasized once again
the historical provenance of the categories.28 Specifically, in United States v.
Stevens, in 2010, the Court held that the only content-based regulations of speech
that are not presumptively invalid under the First Amendment are those that target
speech that either falls into a “previously recognized, long-established category of
unprotected speech” or constitutes a “category of speech that ha[s] been historically
unprotected, but ha[s] not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in
[the] case law.”29 In holding as much, the Court acknowledged the possibility that
new categories of low-value speech might be added to the list of what it described
as the “historic and traditional” categories of low-value exception “long familiar to
the bar.”30 Nevertheless, it insisted that in all cases these novel categories be
identified on the basis of historical evidence. Specifically, what it required to
establish the existence of a historically unprotected but heretofore unrecognized
category of low-value speech was evidence of a “long-settled tradition of subjecting
that speech to regulation.”31 The next year, the Court clarified that what was
required was “persuasive evidence . . . of a long (if heretofore unrecognized)
tradition of proscription.”32
By emphasizing—and in Stevens, insisting on—the historical basis of the lowvalue categories, the Court has attempted to depict the distinction between high and
low-value speech as the product of something other than the perhaps idiosyncratic
value judgments and preferences of its individual members. What it instead reflects,
Roth, Beauharnais and Stevens suggest, is a well-established consensus about what
kinds of speech are—and more to the point, are not—included in the “speech” and
“press” whose freedom is protected against abridgment by the First Amendment.
Construed as such, the distinction between high and low-value speech appears
much less threatening to the basic neutrality of First Amendment law than might
otherwise be the case because it offers judges little opportunity to read their own
preferences and ideological commitments onto the Constitution. Instead, history
constrains judicial discretion, and in so doing, helps ensure that judges maintain
fidelity to the original meaning of freedom of speech.
At least this is what the Court argued in Stevens to justify its conclusion that the
only content-based regulations of speech that do not trigger a presumption of
invalidity are those that target historically unprotected speech. The case involved a
dispute over the constitutionality of a federal statute that criminalized the creation,
sale, and possession of visual or auditory images of animal cruelty when the
conduct depicted in those images occurred in violation of federal or state law.33 The
government argued that the statute was constitutional because the speech it
27

Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
See infra notes _ - _, and accompanying text.
29
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471-72.
30
Id. at 472.
31
Id.
32
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
33
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §48).
28
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regulated was entitled to little or no First Amendment protection when evaluated
according to what it called the “Chaplinsky balancing test.”34 This test, the
government claimed, required courts to balance “the expressive value of the speech
with its societal costs.”35 Because depictions of cruelty to animals formed “no
essential part of any exposition of ideas” and incurred significant social costs, the
government argued that their prohibition did not violate the First Amendment.36
The Stevens majority adamantly rejected this argument, and the interpretation of
the Chaplinsky doctrine that supported it, as anathema to fundamental
constitutional principles. As Chief Justice Roberts put it, in his majority opinion:
[F]rom 1791 to the present. . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions
upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never "include[d] a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. . . . The Government contends
that “historical evidence” about the reach of the First Amendment is not a
necessary prerequisite for regulation today, and that categories of speech may
be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without any long-settled
tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation. . . . [I]t argues that w]hether a
given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a
categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs. As a
free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and
dangerous. The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.37
Balancing provides an illegitimate mechanism for determining when the
ordinary First Amendment rules apply, this passage suggests, because it allows
judges to impose their own values onto the Constitution. Implicit in this passage is
the suggestion that the historical test the Court instead required poses no such threat
to the basic neutrality of the First Amendment because it forces judges to comply
with original and fixed understandings of what speech is “worth” protecting. As
William Araiza notes of the argument: “Because th[e] historical method [that
Stevens calls for] implies not a creation of new categories but a discovery of
categories that have always existed, it is presumably impervious to context-based
analysis or the perceived needs of the moment, at least to the extent courts employ
it conscientiously.”38
History can only constrain judicial discretion in this way, however, if there are
in fact categories of low-value speech that “have always existed” or if the historical
record is, at the very least, sufficiently clear and consistent in its treatment of
Petitioner’s Brief at 12, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769).
Id.
36
Id. at 21 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
37
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (internal citations omitted).
38
William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First
Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 830 (2011).
34
35
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different kinds of speech to bind judges when their intuitions or preferences would
lead them another way. It is perhaps because it recognizes the threat that a murky
and inconsistent record posed to the theoretical justification for the doctrine of lowvalue speech that the Court has consistently emphasized the well-defined and
narrowly limited nature of the low-value categories.
There is little historical evidence, however, to back up the Court’s claim that
the categories of low-value speech we recognize as such today constituted, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, well-defined and narrowly limited exceptions
to the ordinary constitutional rules. Nor is there evidence to suggest, as the Stevens
Court implied, that the contemporary distinction between high and low-value
speech maps onto an earlier, let alone original, understanding of what counted as
speech or press for constitutional purposes.
First Amendment scholars have not paid a great deal of attention to the pretwentieth century case law dealing with freedom of speech and press, perhaps out
of the mistaken assumption that there are too few cases from this period to tell us
much.39 Indeed, if one sticks merely to cases dealing with the First Amendment, the
eighteenth and nineteenth-century case law on questions of speech and press
freedom is slim. There is little reason to limit the historical inquiry in this way,
however, given the widely-shared assumption in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries that the First Amendment did not create new rights but merely declared—
in order to better protect—rights that existed prior to its ratification and that were
guaranteed also by the speech and press clauses provided for in all the state
constitutions.40 The dozens upon dozens of state cases that engaged questions of
39

See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1991)
(critiquing the tendency of the “orthodox academic history [of the First Amendment to] begin[] with
the censorship of the World War I seditious libel cases” and citing examples); Philip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 911 n.15 (1993)
noting the paucity of scholarship exploring “the idea of freedom of speech and press in the
nineteenth century”).
40
As the Louisiana Supreme Court put it in 1882:
The Constitution of the State of Louisiana contains a Bill of Rights. Such Bills are
modelled upon the famous English Bill of Rights, and, in the language thereof, are intended
as public declarations of the “true, ancient and indubitable rights of the people.” They are
declaratory of the general principles of republican government, and of the fundamental
rights of the citizen, rights usually of so fundamental a character, that, while such express
declarations may serve to guard and protect them, they are not essential to the creation of
such rights, which exist independent of constitutional provisions. In our Bill of Rights, side
by side with the rights of bearing arms, of religious freedom, of free speech, of assembly
and petition, of habeas corpus, is found the declaration that “no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of the press.” A similar provision has existed in every Constitution
of this State, exists in the Constitution of the United States and that of every State of this
Union. It is a principle of English and American government, and whatever variety may be
found in the forms of expression used in different instruments, they all signify the same
thing, and convey the general idea which is crystallized in the common phrase, “liberty of
the press.” This is what the Constitution intends to recognize and to guarantee, and in order
to ascertain what meaning and effect to give to the Constitution, we have only to inquire
what is meant by “liberty of the press.”
State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 741-747 (La. 1882). See
also THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 415-16 (1868) (asserting that the
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freedom of speech and press thus provide a helpful guide to what courts generally
understood the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by both the state and federal
constitutions to mean. For this reason, the Court itself has frequently turned to these
cases to decipher the meaning of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press freedom.41
The next Part examines the state, as well as federal, case law from the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dealing with questions of freedom of speech
and press.42 What these cases demonstrate is that early American courts did not in
fact recognize the existence of a delimited set of well-defined and narrowly limited
categories to which the constitutional guarantees of press and speech freedom did
not apply. Instead, they applied the same constitutional principles to both what we
today would consider to be high-value speech and what we would consider to be
low. Rather than a product of longstanding jurisprudential tradition, what the
eighteenth and nineteenth century cases make clear is that the distinction between
high and low-value speech is instead a product of far more recent changes in First
Amendment law.
II.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH PRIOR TO THE NEW DEAL

To contemporary eyes, one of the most remarkable features of the eighteenth
and nineteenth-century free speech case law is its almost complete inattention to
what in the twentieth century would emerge as one of the most pressing and
controversial of First Amendment questions: namely, to what kinds of expressions
do the guarantees of speech and press freedom apply? Indeed, in only one of the
dozens upon dozens of reported cases in which eighteenth and nineteenth century
courts engaged directly with free speech or press claims did a court conclude that a
particular kind of expression was not covered by the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of press.43 For the most part, eighteenth and nineteenthstate and federal constitutional guarantees of free expression “do not create new rights, but their
purpose is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already possessed” and that, as a result,
we must look to the common law “in order that we may ascertain what the rights are which are thus
protected, and what is the extent of the privileges they assure”); Hamburger, supra note _ at 913
(“Late eighteenth-century Americans typically assumed that natural rights, including the freedom
of speech and press, were subject to natural law”); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1133-35, 1161-67 (1987) (noting that the rights provisions
in both the state and federal constitutions were understood in the eighteenth century as declaratory
of inherent and natural rights that preexisted their enactment).
41
See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 482 n.11-13; Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254; Near v. State of
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719 n.11 (1931).
42
Because in the contemporary period, the guarantee of freedom of press has been subsumed
within the guarantee of freedom of speech, I do not distinguish in my analysis of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century case law decisions dealing with freedom of press specifically and those dealing
with freedom of speech. Both elucidate the traditional understanding of what today we think of as
freedom of speech. See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028
(2011) (“The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value of the free press, but it
steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as emanating solely from the Press
Clause”).
43
See State v. Bair, 60 N.W. 486 (Iowa 1894) (holding that prosecution under the state
“Pharmacy Act” which prohibited itinerant vendors of drugs and other medical treatments from
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century courts either assumed that the constitutional guarantees applied, or ignored
the issue altogether.
Courts paid little attention to delimiting the boundaries of the constitutional
categories of speech and press because they did not need to. For much of this period
it was widely assumed that what the state and federal constitutional guarantees of
expressive freedom provided speakers was almost-absolute protection against the
prior restraint of speech or writing but only limited protection against punishment
after the fact for what they wrote or uttered. The freedom that the First Amendment
and state provisions guaranteed, in other words, was freedom of expression but not
freedom from responsibility for the ill effects of what one expressed. As Joseph
Story put it, in his influential 1833 treatise on the federal constitution:
[T]he language of [the First] amendment imports no more than that every
man shall have the right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any
subject whatsoever, without any prior restraints, so always, that he does not
injure any other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation; and so
always, that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to
subvert the government. . . . Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the
freedom of the press. But, if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or
illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.44
Story’s acceptance of the constitutionality of punishing speech that was
“improper, mischievous or illegal” did not mean—as critics of the eighteenth and
nineteenth-century view later argued—that he and other jurists believed that
government could restrain speech post-publication or post-utterance in whatever
way it pleased.45 Although this view of the freedom of speech and press had been
“publicly profess[ing] to cure or treat disease, or injury or deformity,” absent receipt of a license to
do so from the state, did not violate the state constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom
on the grounds that the “prohibitive features of the act do not go to the rights intended to be secured
by the constitutional provision as to speaking, writing, or publishing one's sentiments, or as to
abridging or restraining the liberty of the press”). In one other nineteenth-century case, a court held
that a particular kind of expression was within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech and press. See Dailey v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 112 Cal. 94 (1896) (concluding
that “[t]he production of a tragedy or comedy upon the theatrical stage is a publication to the world
by word of mouth of the text of the author” and is therefore protected by the free speech and press
provision of the California Constitution).
44
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 3:§1874
(1833). See also COOLEY, supra note _, at 422 (“[W]e understand liberty of speech and of the press
to imply not only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment for
the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested by such standards as the law
affords. For these standards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force when the
constitutional guaranties were established.”). Although Story was speaking of the federal
constitution, state courts invoked this passage frequently when interpreting the meaning of state
guarantees of press and speech freedom. See, e.g., In re Banks, 56 Kan. 242, 242-244 (Kan. 1895);
State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227, 37 S.W. 938, 939-40 (1896); State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227, 37
S.W. 938, 939-40 (1896); State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 743750 (La. 1882).
45
Zechariah Chafee, most prominently, argued that a number of early nineteenth-century courts
adopted the view that, under the First Amendment, “government cannot interfere by a censorship or
injunction before the words are spoken or printed, but can punish them as much as it pleases after
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propagated by some supporters of the Sedition Act of 1798, by the early nineteenth
century it had largely been renounced.46 Story himself made clear that limits existed
on what speech government could punish, even after publication. He noted, for
example, that government could not, concordant with the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of press, impose criminal penalties on the publication of true
statements made “with good motives and for justifiable ends.”47 Even William
Blackstone, the figure primarily associated with the view that the guarantee of press
freedom operated exclusively as a bar on prior restraints, agreed that government
could only criminally punish speech when it constituted what he called a “public
vice”—that is, when it posed a public threat of some kind to civil society.48
The constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom thus did impose
constraints on the after-the-fact punishment of expression. Nevertheless these
constraints were far weaker than they would later be. As a result, expression could
be criminally sanctioned whenever it posed even a relatively attenuated threat to
public peace and order. What this meant, in practice, was that little depended on
whether a given mode of expression was or was not recognized to constitute speech
or press for constitutional purposes, other than the constitutionality of its prior
restraint.
Perhaps for this reason, eighteenth and nineteenth century courts tended to
employ a relatively expansive conception of the constitutional categories of speech
and press. Even when litigants raised novel constitutional claims—when, for
example, in the late nineteenth century, unions began to challenge state laws that
restricted labor picketing on free speech grounds—courts spent very little energy
publication, no matter how harmless or essential to the public welfare the discussion may be.”
Chafee, supra note _, at 938.
46
For example, Congressman Harry Gray Otis argued in 1798 that the Sedition Act was
constitutional because the “liberty of the press [guaranteed by the First Amendment] is merely an
exemption from all previous restraints.” 8 Annals of Congress 2145 (July 10, 1798). Most supporters
of the Act defended its constitutionality on other grounds, however. See GEOFFREY STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 44 (2005) (“Even many supporters of the Sedition Act defended it not by invoking the
perfect freedom of the government when it came to the post-publication regulation of speech but
instead by pointing to the constraints on publication built into the Act….The Sedition Act provided
that malicious intent was an essential element of the crime, that truth was a defense, and that the
jury should decide whether the speech had a seditious effect. Federalists could therefore boast that
the 1798 act had eliminated those aspects of the English common law that had been particularly
controversial in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”).
47
STORY, supra note _, at §1874.
48
Moral transgressions that impacted only the individual himself, Blackstone argued—what he
called “private vices”—were not within the power of the secular state to punish. WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42 (George Sharswood ed. 1893)
(“[H]uman laws can have no concern with any but social and relative duties, being intended only to
regulate the conduct of man, considered under various relations, as a member of civil society. All
crimes ought therefore to be estimated merely according to the mischiefs which they produce in
civil society . . . and of consequence private vices … cannot be, the object of any municipal law any
further than as by their evil example, or other pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community
and thereby become a species of public crimes.”). Hence, the “vice of lying, which consists
(abstractedly taken) in a criminal violation of truth” could not be subject to criminal punishment
unless and until it caused “some public inconvenience, [such] as spreading false news; or some
social injury, [such] as slander and malicious prosecution.” Id. at 41-42.
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exploring whether picketing constituted speech for constitutional purposes. Most
nineteenth and early-twentieth century courts simply assumed that they did. Many
nevertheless found that the activity could be prohibited nonetheless—and even in
some cases enjoined—because it was coercive or violent.49
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century courts also tended to treat acts of symbolic
expression as the functional equivalent of acts of linguistic expression. As a result,
they extended to “[p]aintings, liberty poles, and other [kinds of] symbolic
expression . . . no less and no more protect[ion] than spoken and printed words.”50
For this reason, a number of state supreme courts struck down as unconstitutional
prior restraints the permit regulations that in the late nineteenth-century,
municipalities began to impose on parades and processions of all kind.51
A. Low-Value Speech
Courts also extended protection, at least against prior restraint, to many of the
categories of what would later be recognized to be low-value expression.

49

See, e.g., Local Union No. 313, Hotel & Rest. Employees' Int'l Alliance, v. Stathakis, 205
S.W. 450, 452 (Ark. 1918) (“Early cases upholding the right of picketing likened that action to the
exercise of the right of free speech…. The existence of this right is still generally conceded, and we
think such right exists. . . . But as the cases continued to come before the courts and the law on the
subject to be molded, it became more and more apparent that picketing was practiced and resorted
to, not alone for purposes of publicity and persuasion, but for coercion and intimidation as well; so
that, while the tendency of the earlier cases was to uphold picketing as an exercise of the right of
free speech, the tendency of later cases is to restrict that right as an act of coercion in its tendencies,
and one which in its practical application tends generally to breaches of the peace and other
disorders. . . .”); Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 650 (Ky. 1904) (“The constitutional right of
free speech may not be infringed. Peaceful persuasions or lawful appeals to reason or sentiment may
not be interfered with. But when intimidation and violence are resorted to, and thereby property is
destroyed, or its safety imperiled, the chancellor may properly, by injunction, protect the owner of
the property in the enjoyment of his constitutional right that his property shall not be taken from
him.”). Other courts held that constitutional guarantees did in fact prevent, at the least, the enjoinder
of labor activity absent evidence that it would lead to violence. See Standard Tube & Forkside Co.
v. International Union of Bicycle Workers, 9 Ohio Dec. 692, 692-696 (Ohio C.P. 1899) (dissolving
court injunction of workers’ strike during which “considerable freedom of speech was used” but the
court found little evidence that “anything was said or done . . . to coerce or intimidate”); Richter
Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 11 Ohio Dec. 45 (C.P. 1890) (refusing to enjoin a strike absent
any evidence of likely harm to property and noting the general American rule that equity will not
allow the injunction of libels except when harm to property interests are at stake). See generally
Joseph Tanenhaus, Picketing as Free Speech: Early Stages in the Growth of the New Law of
Picketing, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 397, 398-402 (1952) (discussing the more than fifty late-nineteenth
and early twentieth century cases in which courts examined the relationship between picketing and
free speech).
50
Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97
Geo. L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (2009). Liberty poles were, as Volokh explains, “tall poles that were
crowned with flags or ‘liberty caps.’” “They originated before the Revolution as symbols of hostility
to the assertedly oppressive English government, but by the 1790s, they had become symbols of
hostility to asserted oppression by the federal government.” Id. at 1072.
51
See City of Chi. v. Trotter, 26 N.E. 359 (Ill. 1891), Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P.
719 (Kan. 1888), In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886), and In re Garrabad v. Dering, 54 N.W.
1104 (Wis. 1893), with Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N.E. 79 (Mass. 1892).
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Commercial Advertising
Consider for example the case of commercial advertising. Advertising has been
considered a category of low-value speech since the 1942 decision, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, in which the Court rather summarily denied that the constitution’s
protections applied to this kind of speech.52 Valentine was not, however, the first
advertising free speech case to come across the Court’s docket. In the late
nineteenth century, the Court decided two.53 In both cases, litigants challenged the
constitutionality of federal statutes that prohibited the circulation in the mail of
lottery advertisements and circulars on the grounds that they violated the freedom
of press guaranteed by the First Amendment. In neither case did the Court reject
the assertion that freedom of press limited Congress’s power to regulate
advertising. It instead asked whether the federal laws violated the guarantee of
freedom of press and concluded that they did not because they did not preclude the
distribution of lottery advertising by means other than through the mail.54 The Court
thus upheld the regulation, but noted that Congress had no power to prohibit more
broadly the transportation of the prohibited materials because “[l]iberty of
circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without
the circulation, the publication would be of little value.”55
The Court interpreted the First Amendment, in other words, to impose a
significant but by no means insuperable limit on the federal government’s power to
restrain the circulation of printed material, including commercial advertisements—
even commercial advertisements that the Court clearly recognized as “injurious to
the public morals.”56 This was entirely in keeping with the weak nineteenth-century
view of press and speech freedom generally. Certainly, at no point in the opinion
did the Court suggest that the principles of freedom of speech or press applied
differently to advertisers than to others, such as newspaper publishers, who
disseminated printed material to the public at large.
The Court’s failure to distinguish between the free press rights of newspaper
publishers and commercial advertisers suggests, as Stuart Banner and Judge Alex
Kozinski note, that “the Jackson Court implicitly considered advertising (or at least
printed circulars advertising lotteries) to be speech entitled to the same degree of
First Amendment protection as any other.”57 Or at least, it suggests how little rode
on the distinction between regulations targeted at commercial advertising and
regulations targeted at other kinds of speech, given the Court’s general conclusion

52

316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
54
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736. See also Rapier, 143 U.S. at 134 (“We cannot regard the right to
operate a lottery as a fundamental right infringed by the legislation in question; nor are we able to
see that Congress can be held, in its enactment, to have abridged the freedom of the press. The
circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent
in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people.”).
55
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
56
Id. at 734.
57
Alex Kozinksi and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech,
71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 765 (1993).
53
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that Congress possessed the power to prohibit any printed materials it wished to
from the mails, just so long as it allowed their circulation via other means.
Nor was the Supreme Court the only court to subject the regulation of
advertising to First Amendment scrutiny. In the early twentieth century, at least two
lower courts treated advertising in much the same way. That is, they denied the free
speech or press claims of the advertisers, but did not deny that the constitutional
principle of freedom of press applied.58
Libel
Advertising was not the only kind of low-value speech to which eighteenth and
nineteenth century courts applied some degree of constitutional scrutiny. In fact,
constitutional concerns constrained to varying degrees the prosecution and
punishment of all four of the kinds of speech identified as low-value by the
Chaplinsky Court. These concerns were clearest in the case of libel. Indeed, the
prosecution of libel—far from raising no constitutional problem, as the Chaplinsky
Court asserted—was in many respects at the center of debates about the meaning
of freedom of the press in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Both prior to and after the Revolution, arguments raged among courts, lawyers,
and publishers about the extent to which the traditional common law rule that truth
was no defense to criminal libel was compatible with the constitutional principle of
freedom of the press.59 Important revolutionary figures, such as Alexander
Hamilton, argued that, in order to safeguard press freedom, true statements, at least
those published with good motives, should not be considered criminally libelous.60
Others disagreed, arguing that true statements were just as likely as false ones to
cause mischief and disorder.61
The Hamiltonian side ultimately won. By the early nineteenth century, most
states had altered the common law rules to allow truth as a defense to accusations
58
Buxbom v. Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3, 3-6 (D. Cal. 1939) (applying, without inquiry, the state
guarantee of free speech to advertising materials but upholding a municipal ordinance that
prohibited their distribution on the grounds of private residences without the permission of the
owner on the grounds that the ordinance left adequate alternative means of communication);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 Ga. (1905) (balancing the right to privacy against
the right of free press in a case involving a newspaper advertisement, and affirming the plaintiff’s
claim to invasion of privacy after his image was used without his permission in an insurance ad).
59
The classic articulation of the common-law rule was provided by William Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England. BLACKSTONE, supra note _, at 150-151. As Blackstone
makes clear, what motivated the rule was the belief that the purpose of criminal libel law was to
prevent the breaches of the peace that would otherwise occur when those defamed took it upon
themselves to take revenge for the injury. Id. (“In a criminal prosecution, the tendency which all
libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is the sole consideration of the
law.”). Understood as such, there was no reason for the law to prosecute only untrue libels, given
that both appeared equally likely to stir up animosity that might result in violence.
60
See ROSENBERG, supra note _ at 110-115.
61
In 1811, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the argument that truth
should be allowed as a defense in cases of criminal libel on the grounds that doing so would only
encourage strife. Relaxation of the old rule, the Court argued, would allow libelers to expose “the
secret infirmities of their neighbors” or “imprudencies, long since committed and repented….” State
v. Lehre, 2 Rev. Reps. 447 (S.C. 1811) (quoted in ROSENBERG, at 107).
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of libel, although most also required, as Hamilton urged, a showing that the true
libel had been published with good motives.62 In some states, the defense was
available only to “papers investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a
public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information.”63
However, in many states, the privilege extended to defendants in ordinary libel suits
as well.64 In both cases, the rule was motivated by the belief that imposing criminal
liability on true speech threatened the expressive freedom that the American
Revolution, and the state and federal constitutions enacted in its wake, were
intended to protect. As Justice James Kent of the New York Supreme Court argued
in 1804, to justify his adoption of the Hamilton “truth-plus” standard for criminal
libel:
The first American congress, in 1774, in one of their public addresses,
enumerated five invaluable rights, without which a people cannot be free and
happy . . . . One of these rights was the freedom of the press . . . [T]he
Convention of the people of this state, which met in 1788 . . . declared,
unanimously, that the freedom of the press was a right which could not be
abridged or violated. The same opinion is contained in the amendment to the
constitution of the United States, and to which this state was a party. . . . These
multiplied acts and declarations are the highest, the most solemn, and
commanding authorities that the state or the nation can produce. . . . And it
seems impossible that they could have spoken with so much explicitness and
energy, if they had intended nothing more than that restricted and slavish press,
which may not publish anything, true or false, that reflects on the character and
administration of public men. . . . I am far from intending that these authorities
mean, by the freedom of the press, a press wholly beyond the reach of the law,
for this would be emphatically Pandora's box, the source of every evil. . . .
[Nevertheless] I adopt, in this case, as perfectly correct, the comprehensive and
accurate definition of one of the counsel at the bar, that the liberty of the press
consists in the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good motives, and for
justifiable ends, whether it respects government, magistracy, or individuals.65
Although Justice Kent was not able to sway the majority of justices on the Court
to his position, his opinion ultimately persuaded the New York legislature to amend
the state constitution to specifically allow parties charged with libel to introduce
the Hamiltonian truth-plus defense.66 Similar motivations led courts in other states
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ROSENBERG, supra note _ at 105.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, Art. IX, § 11, Tennessee Constitution of 1796,
Art. I, § 19; Illinois Constitution of 1818, Art. XIII, § 23.
64
See, e.g., Rhode Island Constitution of 1843, Art I, § 20; Connecticut Constitution of 1818,
Art. I, § 7; New York Constitution of 1821, Art. I, § 8; New Jersey Constitution of 1844, Art 1, § 5;
West Virginia Constitution of 1863, Art. II, § 5; Indiana Constitution of 1851, Art. I, § 10; Michigan
Constitution of 1835, Art. I, § 7; Wisconsin Constitution of 1846, Art. IX, § 3; California
Constitution of 1849, Art. I, § 9.
65
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804) (italics in the original).
66
PETER J. GALIE, CHRISTOPHER BOPST, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION 76 (2d ed.
2012).
63
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to adopt a similar rule, even absent an explicit constitutional provision authorizing
them to do so.67
Nor was the truth-plus defense the only way in which the prosecution of libel
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was constrained by constitutional
principles. Courts also refused to enjoin allegedly libelous speech on the grounds
that doing so constituted a prior restraint on expression. The only exception to this
rule was when the party seeking the injunction could demonstrate that he or she
enjoyed a property right to the speech in question, or when the injunction was
necessary to prevent “irreparable injury to, and the destruction of” the complaining
party’s property rights.68 In such cases, the right to free expression lost out to the
right to property. Otherwise, the rule was absolute. Hence, in 1839, the New York
Court of Chancery denied the plaintiff’s application for a court order to restrain the
publication of an allegedly libelous pamphlet on the grounds that doing would be
to “infring[e] upon the liberty of the press, and attempt[] to exercise a power of
preventive justice which, as the legislature has decided, cannot safely be entrusted
to any tribunal consistently with the principles of a free government.”69 In 1876,
the Missouri Supreme Court made a similar, equally forceful argument, to explain
its decision to dissolve the injunction the lower court had imposed on the
publication of “false, slanderous, malicious, and libelous statements.”70 The
plaintiff claimed that because the publishers of the statements were insolvent,
injunctive relief was the only meaningful remedy he had available to him. The
Court held that, even if this was so, the injunction could not stand because to do so
would be to violate the state constitutional guarantees of speech and press
freedom.71
Obscene and Profane Speech
The prosecution of obscene and profane speech also was constrained by
constitutional concerns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was the case
notwithstanding the disfavor with which late-nineteenth courts and legislators
regarded obscenity in particular, and the breadth of materials they were willing to
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In 1808, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held, for example, that although truth by itself did
not provide a complete defense to the charge of criminal libel, in such a case, the defendant may
give evidence of truth in order to show that “the publication was for a justifiable purpose, and not
malicious, nor with the intent to defame any man” and on those grounds, not libelous.
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169 (1808).
68
Judson v. Zurhorst, 20 Ohio C.D. 9 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1907). See also Brandreth, 8 Paige at 24
(“An injunction to restrain a publication can only be granted in cases where the publication will
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consider obscene.72 Because both obscene and profane speech were technically
considered to be species of libel, eighteenth, nineteenth and early-twentieth century
courts generally agreed that speech of this kind could not be restrained in advance
without violating the constitutional guarantees of expressive freedom.73 As a Texas
court explained, in 1893:
The power to prohibit the publication of newspapers is not within the compass
of legislative action in this State, and any law enacted for that purpose would
clearly be in derogation of the Bill of Rights. . . . The power to suppress one
concedes the power to suppress all, whether such publications are political,
secular, religious, decent or indecent, obscene or otherwise. The doctrine of the
Constitution must prevail in this State, which clothes the citizen with liberty to
speak, write, or publish his opinion on any and all subjects, subject alone to
responsibility for the abuse of such privilege.74
As this passage makes clear, the prohibition against enjoining obscene or
profane speech was not granted to such speech for its own sake. Instead, it was
because what was in fact obscene, blasphemous, or otherwise indecent could not
be determined in the abstract that courts refused to grant the government the power
to vet speech in advance of publication or utterance. The rule, on this view, was
purely prophylactic.75 Nevertheless what it meant was that, for all intents and
purposes, obscenity, like all other forms of speech and writing, was constitutionally
protected against prior restraint, if not post-publication sanctions.
Even in the early twentieth-century—during a period when both the federal and
the state governments were expending significant resources to rout out and
72
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prosecute obscenity76—courts remained firm in their refusal to enjoin the
publication of indecent or obscene materials. As an Ohio court noted, somewhat
regretfully, in 1907, in response to the plaintiff’s request for a court order, enjoining
the publication of what he claimed were obscene libels about him:
Article 1, Sec. 11 of the Ohio constitution declares that: “Every citizen may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech, or of the press….” It is clear that the constitution here
provides for the fullest liberty of speech, but subject always to the proviso that
every citizen must be held responsible for his abuse of the right. . . . Were we
empowered to formulate original principles of law and lay down new rules by
which courts of equity should be guided, such an argument would appeal
strongly to our consciences and judgment. But we have no such power …. In a
proper case instituted by one legally authorized to represent the public, the
public exhibition of lewd pictures, immodest statuary, or immoral plays, would
unquestionably be enjoined, or otherwise suppressed; and for the same reason
an obscene book or pamphlet is prohibited transit through the United States
mails. The case presented to us, however, is not of that character and does not
authorize the relief sought.77
To contemporary eyes, the distinction drawn by the Ohio court—between
enjoining the exhibition and sale of “lewd pictures, immodest statuary [and]
immoral plays” and enjoining the publication or manufacture of such goods—may
seem so formalistic and insubstantial as to make whatever “protection” the freedom
of press provided obscene materials essentially meaningless. But in fact the
prohibition against prior restraint was not entirely toothless. It meant, for one thing,
that the government had to prove, not merely allege, that the materials it wished to
enjoin were obscene—and, in most jurisdictions, to do so to the satisfaction of a
jury, not a judge.78 Requiring juries to define what was obscene after the fact took
the power away from individual government officials. And making the jury the
arbiter of what was obscene ensured that the prosecution of speech obeyed
community norms—and resulted in relatively few obscenity convictions, at least in
the eighteenth and early to mid-nineteenth centuries.79
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That these restraints on the government’s power to prevent and punish obscene
or otherwise “indecent” speech were felt to be both significant and constitutionally
mandated is demonstrated by the opposition that developed when legislators
attempted to undermine them. In 1868, for example, Republicans in the New York
Senate were forced to take out of a new municipal obscenity bill a provision that
authorized magistrates to issue warrants directing police officials to search and
destroy materials the magistrate declared summarily to be “obscene and indecent”
after the provision generated intense opposition among the Democratic minority
and the Democratic-leaning press.80 Critics argued that the proposed provision
would undermine both due process and freedom of the press. An editorial in the
Sunday Mercury described the provision, for example, as evidence of “Radical
despotism” and noted that the provision would empower “any magistrate or any
policeman . . . [who] finds a paper with an advertisement in it that he thinks is not
sufficiently refined for his pure imagination—[to] seize the same and transmit
specimens of it to the District-Attorney’s office, and forthwith destroy the
remainder thereof; in other words, destroy the entire edition of the paper . . . without
complaint or process of law . . . . This . . . is a new illustration of the liberty of the
press.”81 When the bill was finally enacted into law, it allowed seizure and
destruction of obscene materials only after trial.82
The kerfuffle over the 1868 obscenity bill points to the important, albeit
attenuated, role that concerns with press and speech freedom played in the
regulation of even obscene or “indecent” speech in the nineteenth century. It calls
into question the twentieth century Court’s assertion that obscenity was
traditionally considered entirely “outside the protection intended for speech and
press.”83 Indeed, it was only in the twentieth century that courts first suggested that
the prior injunction of speech of this kind might not infringe upon the constitutional
rights of speech and press.84 It was only in the twentieth century, in other words,
that courts began to treat obscenity as if it were not in fact “speech at all” for
constitutional purposes.85
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Fighting Words
Even the prosecution of what the Chaplinsky Court called “fighting words” was
constrained to some degree by constitutional concerns.86 Insulting or offensive
language tended to be prosecuted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as
disorderly conduct or as the common-law offense of public nuisance.87 In the
second half of the nineteenth century, however, states and municipalities began to
pass more specific statutory prohibitions on the public use of “offensive or insulting
language.”88 In construing these statutes, courts made clear that there were limits
on the government’s ability to criminally punish speech merely because of its
offensive or insulting content. In Ex Parte Kearny in 1880, for example, the
California Supreme Court held that a municipal statute that prohibited any person
from “utter[ing] in the presence of another, any words, language or expression,
having a tendency to create a breach of the peace” could only be constitutionally
applied when the insulting or offensive language was actually “addressed to, or
spoken in the presence of, the person whom they have a tendency to incite to a
breach of the peace.”89 Any other construction of the statute, the Court held, would
allow the government to too easily evade the careful constitutional constraints
otherwise imposed on the prosecution of insulting or disorderly speech. As the
Court explained:
The freedom of the press is surrounded by many constitutional safeguards. . . .
Will it be contended that the printer may be deprived of this great constitutional
right by providing that he shall be punished, not for libel, but for the publication
of words having a tendency to produce a breach of the peace? . . . To hold that
the conversation of intimate friends may be reported, or the privacy of domestic
circles invaded, to secure evidence of declarations, which, if subsequently
communicated to the person to whom they relate, may, in the opinion of a jury
in the Police Court, “have a tendency” to induce him to commit a breach of the
peace, would recognize and encourage a system of espionage abhorrent to
American ideas, and productive of more evil than the practice condemned . . . .
That such an ordinance would not accord with our governing policy is further
evidenced, perhaps, by the circumstance that no like prohibitory legislation has
ever been attempted in this or other States.”90
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The Court held, in other words, that the mere utterance of words that, in the
abstract, had a tendency to breach the peace, was not something that the
municipality could punish and remain true to the principles that governed the U.S.
constitutional system.
Other courts were rather more generous in what they allowed legislatures.
Indeed, in other jurisdictions, courts affirmed the conviction of individuals who
engaged in offensive or disruptive speech even when this speech was not directly
aimed at any one individual, let alone likely to provoke a fight.91 Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court appears to have been correct that in no jurisdictions was
the mere utterance of insulting or provoking words a crime.92 As the Tennessee
Supreme Court noted in 1856, “mere quarrelsome words [without more] are not a
punishable offense.”93 Instead, what was prohibited was the disruption created by
the public expression of offensive or insulting language in a context in which such
expression was likely to lead to violence or disorder of some sort. The content of
the speech alone was not sufficient to justify prosecution, given both constitutional
concerns with freedom of expression and common-law concerns with the limits of
secular state power.
A. High-Value Speech
As Ex Parte Kearny demonstrates, eighteenth and nineteenth century courts
extended some degree of constitutional protection to many kinds of low-value
speech. Conversely, courts during this period upheld the imposition of criminal
sanctions on many kinds of high-value speech that was perceived to be (to use
Story’s language) “improper, mischievous, or illegal.”
For example, courts imposed sometimes steep penalties on journalists or
newspapers who reported on public trials in a manner that appeared to threaten the
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impartial administration of justice or to demean the judge.94 Courts justified doing
so not by claiming that newspaper reports about public trials were categorically
excluded from constitutional protection. To the contrary: it was widely recognized
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that one of the purposes of guaranteeing
freedom to the press was to enable the press, as Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief
Justice McKean put it in the 1789 case, Respublica v. Oswald, to lay “open to the
inspection of every citizen . . . the proceedings of the government, of which the
judicial authority is certainly to be considered a branch.”95 The justification was
instead that newspaper reports that insulted or demeaned the court represented an
abuse of the constitutional right of press freedom, rather than an exercise of it. As
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan argued in 1829, just as the Second
Amendment vested citizens with the right to keep and bear arms but not the right
to use these arms to “destroy [their] neighbor[s],” so the First Amendment vested
citizens with the right to publish their sentiments on whatever topic they chose but
did not give them the right to use this privilege for an “unlawful or unjustifiable
purpose.”96
The same distinction between freedom and its abuse justified the criminal
prosecution of many other kinds of high-value speech as well. In 1824, for example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant who
asserted, during a debate organized by a local debating club to which he belonged,
that the Bible was a “fable” that “contained a number of good things, yet . . . a great
many lie[s].”97 The Court found that, although serious debate upon religious matters
could not be prosecuted as blasphemy in light of the constitutional protections
provided for speech as well as religion, language of this sort—at least when uttered
in a public place and “in the presence and hearing of several persons”—constituted
a “gross offence against public decency and public order, tending directly to disturb
the peace of the commonwealth.”98
The court recognized, in other words, that in principle, religious speech was
protected both by the guarantee of freedom of speech and by the guarantee of free
expression. Nevertheless, it found the speech at issue in the case to represent a
threat to public order and public peace, not because it threatened any actual
violence. Indeed, there is no suggestion in the opinion or in counsel’s arguments
that the audience to the debate was riled up by the defendant’s conduct. Instead, the
court concluded that the speech represented a threat to public order because, by
calling into question the truth of the Scriptures, it threatened to undermine “those
religious and moral restraints without the aid of which mere legislative provisions
The offense was generally referred to as “constructive contempt.” For a history of the law of
constructive contempt in the United State see generally Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt: A
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[aimed at keeping order] would prove ineffectual.”99 The speech threatened the
public peace, in other words, by transgressing dominant norms of public piety. This
was all the court required to convict.100
Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts also upheld the imposition of
sanctions on political speech not only when it threatened to incite immediate
violence or disorder but also when it appeared to more generally encourage
subversive and dangerous political behavior. Indeed, as David Yassky notes, in the
late eighteenth century, the dominant view of freedom of speech was not that “all
points of view [had to] have access to public debate.” To the contrary: the prevailing
view was that “[l]arge categories of immoderate public speech were . . . properly
subject to censure…. ‘[G]overnment . . . had a positive to monitor—and when
necessary to step in and moderate— political communication.’”101 This was
because it was widely believed that it was only by punishing what eighteenth, as
well as nineteenth century jurists tended to describe simply as “licentiousness”—
namely, speech “inconsistent with the peace and safety of th[e] state—that the
government was able to ensure the longterm stability, and popularity, of the system
of free expression itself. It was only by routing out licentiousness, in other words,
that government was able to protect genuine liberty “from those who would exploit
and degrade it.”102
This view remained dominant in the nineteenth century as well—as
demonstrated by the willingness of nineteenth-century courts to impose sometimes
harsh responsibility punishment on dangerous or subversive political expression. In
People v. Most, for example, the New York Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
of an anarchist under a state statute that criminalized the assembly of three or more
persons who “being assembled… threaten any act tending towards a breach of
peace” after he addressed a crowd of fellow anarchists and warned them that they
day of revolution was “not far distant.”103 The court noted that, although to its eyes
the anarchist’s words were the “ravings of a madman,” it was up to the jury to
99
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discern whether they posed a real threat of public disorder, given the circumstances
in which he spoke.104 The court also adamantly rejected the defense counsel’s
argument that because “the threats [uttered in the speech] related to acts not
presently to be done, but to be performed at some future time,” they did not pose a
real threat to peace and safety. “The main purpose of the common law and of the
statute relating to unlawful assemblies,” the court wrote, “is the protection of the
public peace.
Incendiary speeches under the circumstances disclosed in this case, before
a crowd of ignorant, misguided men, are not less dangerous because the
advice to arm for the redress of grievances, and the threats of murder, are
accompanied with the suggestion that the time is not quite come for action.
. . . No one can foresee the consequences which may result from language
such as was used on this occasion, when addressed to a sympathizing and
highly excited audience.”105
Political speech could be criminally punished, in other words, not only when it
threatened imminent political disorder but also when it spread “incendiary” ideas
to ignorant and misguided men—and thereby threatened in the long run, if not the
short, the safety and security of society.
B. The Broad but Shallow First Amendment
What these cases demonstrate is that eighteenth and nineteenth century courts
applied the same constitutional principles to the regulation of high-value speech as
they applied to the regulation of low-value speech. The general rule in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that speech—no matter how valuable it
might be—could be sanctioned criminally whenever it threatened, as Story put it,
to “disturb the public peace, or . . . subvert the government.”106 But almost no
speech or writing could be enjoined in advance without violating the constitutional
prohibition against prior restraints, except when it posed a threat to person or
property.107
This is not to say that courts and legislators possessed no conception that some
categories of speech might be more valuable than others, and therefore entitled to
a somewhat greater degree of constitutional protection. As we saw above, in many
states, speech that touched on “the official conduct of men in public capacity, or
the qualification of those who are candidates for the suffrage of the people, or . . .
matter . . . . proper for public information” had to be either untrue or malicious in
order to be liable for libel or slander.108 In the civil context, many jurisdictions also
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offered defendants in cases involving what were generally referred to as “matters
of public interest” a qualified privilege that required the plaintiff to prove that the
libel was malicious as well as false in order to receive damages.109 Speech that took
place during a trial or on the floor of the legislature was protected against
accusations of libel because of its great value to the democratic system in the United
States.110
Nevertheless, the difference in the treatment of “high-value” speech of this kind
and other kinds of speech was for the most part relative, not absolute. Speech about
matters of public concern received greater constitutional protection than other kinds
of speech but nevertheless was subject to criminal penalties, as well as civil
liability, when false or motivated by a malicious intent.111 The only speech that
enjoyed an absolute privilege against accusations of libel was that which took place
during legislative proceedings, or during the course of a trial—and even then, false
testimony remained subject to prosecution for perjury.112 Meanwhile, even
blasphemous and obscene speech was protected against injunction and other kinds
of prior restraint.
Courts adopted, in other words, what we could describe as a broad but shallow
conception of the constitutional guarantee of expressive freedom: one that imposed
few constraints on the government’s ability to regulate speech on the basis of its
content but extended constitutional protection—at least against prior restraint—to
almost all speech, even when it was immoral or improper or otherwise devalued.
What this means is that in declaring fighting words, obscenity, libel, and
profanity to be categorically outside the scope of constitutional protection for
speech and press because of what it called their lack of “social value,” the
Chaplinsky Court was not, as it claimed, simply rendering explicit a longstanding
understanding of the limits of constitutional protection for speech and press.
See, e.g., Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 238-239 (Mass. 1877) (“The editor of a newspaper
has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public, fair and reasonable
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LAW OF LIBEL 87-110 (1971) (noting that between the Civil War and 1900, twenty-five states
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Instead, it was creating something new: namely, the two-tier system that continues
to organize the doctrine, more or less, to this day. In the next Part, I explore why
and how the Court did so before turning, in Part IV, to the implications of this
history for the contemporary doctrine.
III.

INVENTING A TRADITION

The 1930s and 1940s marked a new deal for freedom of speech. Although legal
histories of the New Deal tend to emphasize the constitutional changes that took
place during this period in Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,
this was also a period of significant change in First Amendment doctrine.113
It was during this period that a majority of justices on the Court adopted for the
first time the new understanding of freedom of speech that Justices Holmes and
Brandeis had been promoting, largely in dissent, since the teens and twenties, and
that free speech activists had been promoting even earlier than that.114 In contrast
to the more interventionist eighteenth and nineteenth century view, this new
conception of freedom of speech imposed strong constraints on the government’s
ability to punish speech after the fact. Rather than empowering the government to
protect liberty by routing out what eighteenth and nineteenth-century courts
generally described as “licentiousness,” proponents of this view instead argued that
the guarantees of speech and press freedom limited the government’s ability to
decide what was or was not in fact licentious.
Indeed, the great innovation of the New Deal Court’s free speech jurisprudence
was its embrace of the idea that in order to achieve the purposes long associated
with the First Amendment—purposes such as the promotion of democratic
government and the advancement of “truth, science, morality, and arts in
general”— the government had to be forced to tolerate even what it perceived to be
harmful speech, except when that speech was so dangerous that it posed an
imminent threat to the security of the state or to other vital governmental interests,
such as the protection of its citizens against physical harm.115 Justice Holmes had
promoted this idea since at least 1919, when, dissenting in Abrams v. United States,
he famously insisted that: “Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any
exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.’”116 But the Court was initially resistant to it. In Gitlow v.
New York and other early twentieth-century cases, it instead continued to articulate
113
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a view of freedom of speech very close to the nineteenth century view described in
the previous Part.117
By the 1930s, however, significant personnel changes, among other factors, led
the Court to change its view of what it meant to guarantee freedom of speech and
press against abridgment.118 The result was a series of decision that imposed for the
first time significant limits on the government’s ability to punish speech merely
because it believed it to be subversive or immoderate. In 1931, for example, the
Court held that a state statute that prohibited the display of a flag or badge or banner
“as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government” violated the
First Amendment because it was so “vague and indefinite” in its language as to be
construed to allow the punishment of merely peaceful and orderly opposition to
government.”119 In Herndon v. Lowry in 1937, the Court held that a Communist
party member who was charged with insurrection for organizing on behalf of the
party could not be convicted absent evidence that his activities posed a “clear and
present danger of the use of force against the state” or posed some other serious
“danger to organized government.”120 And in Thornhill v. Alabama, in 1940, the
Court extended the use of the clear and present danger test to labor picketing.
Specifically, it held that the state could not prohibit labor picketing absent a “clear
and present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of
privacy, or breach of the peace.” 121 This was because “freedom of speech and of
the press . . . embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment” and picketing, the Court found, provided an important means by
which workers engaged in discussion of this sort. 122
These cases, insofar as they interpreted the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech to impose significant constraints on the government’s ability to restrict
speech ex post as well as ex ante, signal the Court’s decisive break with the
nineteenth century conception. For precisely that reason, however, they also raised
117
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difficult questions about what counted as speech for constitutional purposes—
questions that eighteenth and nineteenth century courts had not had to confront as
directly. Given how much of social life is mediated through language, allowing the
government to restrict or sanction speech only when it threatened “a clear and
present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy,
or breach of the peace” threatened to dramatically impede the government’s ability
to regulate not only political expression but a great deal else.123 Yet, not even the
most zealous advocates of the new, libertarian understanding of freedom of speech
believed it should be interpreted to preclude the government from regulating speech
in any manner whatsoever, save for when it threatened an emergency so severe no
recourse but punishment was possible.124
Nevertheless, as of the 1930s, there existed few doctrinal rules that could aid
courts in determining what counted as speech for constitutional purposes. In his
Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes noted that, in limiting the government’s power to
restrict speech only to emergencies, he was speaking “of course, only of
expressions of opinion and exhortations.”125 Justice Holmes did not elaborate any
further, however, on what the dissent suggests might be a constitutionally-salient
distinction between speech that expresses opinions and speech that does not. Nor
did any other member of the Court subsequently.
And while, in two earlier decisions, the Court had held, for the first time in its
history, that certain kinds of expression were categorically not protected by the
constitutional guarantees of press or speech freedom, neither opinion provided
generalizable principles courts could use in other contexts to determine when the
protections of the First Amendment did and did not apply. In the first decision, the
Court held simply that words likely to trigger an unlawful act may be enjoined,
notwithstanding the First Amendment, because in such circumstances they
constituted “verbal acts” not mere speech.126 In the second opinion, the Court held
that motion pictures are not “part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion” and on that basis sustained an Ohio movie censorship law.127 Although
the opinion represents the first time the Court ruled categorically on the boundary
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of the constitutional category of the press, it provided little hint of what else besides
movies, and perhaps also plays, might be excluded from the category.128
It was in this context that the Court turned to the work of libertarian free speech
theorists—and particularly Zechariah Chafee—to develop a more generalizable
theory for when the protections of the First Amendment did and did not apply.
A. The New Theory
The Court first suggested such a theory in Cantwell v. Connecticut in 1940,
when it reversed the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness accused of inciting others
to breach the peace after he stopped two Catholic men on a street in New Haven,
Connecticut and played for them a phonograph record that attacked all organized
religions as “instruments of Satan.”129 The Court reversed the conviction because
it found insufficient evidence that the defendant’s conduct posed a “clear and
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or
other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.”130 The Court thus made
clear that the clear and present danger standard applied to religious expression just
as it did to the political expression in Herndon and the labor speech in Thornhill.
In dicta, however, it suggested that its analysis would have been different had the
defendant engaged with his unwilling interlocutors in a less polite fashion—if he
had, for example, directed “profane, indecent, or abusive remarks” to his audience,
or engaged in other behavior “likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good
order.”131 This was because, as Justice Roberts wrote in his majority opinion,
“[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.”132
Two years later, Chaplinsky turned the suggestion in Cantwell that certain
kinds of personal attacks were not “in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution” into a more generalizable
test of First Amendment boundaries when it sustained the defendant Walter
Chaplinsky’s conviction under the New Hampshire offensive words statute because
it found that the fighting words for which he was convicted comprised one of a
number of “well-defined and narrowly limited” kinds of speech that were not, nor
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had ever been, protected by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech.133
By identifying certain kinds of speech as categorically outside the scope of
constitutional protection, the opinion made it possible for the government to
continue to regulate speech—at least certain kinds of speech—not only when it
threatened the kind of material harm to person and property that the clear and
present danger test required but also when it threatened more intangible harms.
Indeed, the opinion made clear that speech could be prosecuted as fighting words
not only when it threatened an immediate breach of the peace but when “its very
utterance inflicted injury”—that is, when it caused harm, in the form of offense, by
violating dominant social norms of how individuals were supposed to relate to one
another in public.134
Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts did not tend to distinguish between
these kinds of tangible and intangible harms. Both speech that threatened
immediate violence and speech that threatened to subvert what the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court described in 1824 as “those religious and moral restraints, without
the aid of which mere legislative provisions would prove ineffectual” was
understood, on the broad eighteenth and nineteenth century view, as a threat to the
public peace and therefore something that could be punished without constitutional
problem.
The New Deal Court’s insistence, in cases such as Herndon, Thornhill,
Cantwell, and others, that government could only constitutionally prohibit speech
when it posed a clear and present danger sharply limited the government’s ability
to regulate speech merely because it offended dominant social norms of public
behavior, however. The threat that speech could cause offense was not the kind of
threat that the clear and present danger test allowed the government to guard
against—as the Court made clear in Cantwell, when it refused to affirm Newton
Cantwell’s conviction even though it found that the record he played attacked
religion in general, and Catholicism specifically, “in terms which naturally would
offend not only persons of that persuasion, but all others who respect the honestly
held religious faith of their fellows.”135
The limits the clear and present danger test imposed on the government’s ability
of government officials to restrict speech simply because it found it offensive or
otherwise contrary to social norms was of course one of its virtues.136 But it also
posed a problem, insofar as it limited the state’s ability to enforce those basic
standards of public conduct that even many of the proponents of the new, more
libertarian conception of freedom of speech believed had to be maintained in order
133
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to ensure that speech served its important democratic and truth-promoting
purposes. As Laura Weinrib notes, in the early twentieth century, even members of
the ACLU believed that “censorship on the basis of morality . . . facilitate[d] free
speech, by enhancing public discourse.”137 Some vestiges of the nineteenth century
conception that, in order to preserve liberty the government had to rout out
licentiousness remained very much alive in the New Deal period, in other words,
even among those most ardently committed to the new conception of freedom of
speech.
The Court was clearly sensitive to this problem. In a decision handed down just
several months after Chaplinsky, Justice Reed noted that the individual right to
expressive as well as religious freedom could not be interpreted as an absolute,
given the necessity of reserving to the government “the sovereign power . . .
[required] to ensure [the] orderly living, without which [the] constitutional
guarantees of civil liberty would be a mockery.”138 And in Near v. Minnesota, in
1931, the Court insisted that, just as the government could constitutionally prohibit
as well as enjoin clearly dangerous information—such as the location and
movement of troops during wartime—without violating the First Amendment, it
could also both prohibit and enjoin the publication of obscenity in order to enforce
what the Court called “the primary requirements of decency.”139 The opinion in
Near provided, however, no analytic framework to explain the equivalence it drew
between dangerous speech such as the publication of information about troop
movements during war and indecent speech such as obscenity. Chaplinsky provided
this analytic framework.
By declaring, for largely the first time, that certain categories offensive but not
necessarily dangerous speech were simply outside the scope of constitutional
concern, the decision made it possible for the government to prohibit speech not
only when it threatened violence and disorder but also when it violated dominant
social norms of civility, piety, and decency—by depicting sex in an obscene
manner, for example, or by speaking of others in an uncivil or disrespectful manner,
or by addressing another in words calculated to cause offense. Nevertheless, by
granting this power with respect to only those categories of speech that possess so
little social value that the benefits of their expression are outweighed by the “social
interest in order and morality,” the decision limited the government’s ability to use
this prohibitory power to punish speech merely because it expressed heterodox or
subversive views.
The decision, and the doctrine it gave birth to, thus achieved what we might call
a “reconciliation” between the democratic and libertarian values promoted by the
Court’s clear and present danger line of cases and the other values (morality, public
order, civility) that the regulation of speech had traditionally promoted and that an
unconstrained application of the clear and present danger standard appeared to
threaten.
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B. Problems with the Theory
The reconciliation that the new doctrine of low-value speech made possible was
not unproblematic, however. For one thing, by allowing the government so much
more freedom to regulate low-value speech than high, it made questions of
categorical definition incredibly important—and inspired in subsequent years
sometimes intense disagreement among members of the Court, as well as in the
lower courts, about how precisely to define the various classes of low-value
speech.140
This fighting over how to define the categories only exacerbated what was a
deeper problem with Chaplinsky: that in linking the constitutional status of different
kinds of speech to a judgment of their “social value” or lack thereof, the opinion
existed in considerable tension with what was then emerging as a central principle
of the modern jurisprudence: namely, the principle of content-neutrality.
Although the term content-neutrality would be coined only significantly after
the New Deal period, the idea that government has no right to discriminate against
speech because it disagreed or disliked the message it conveyed played an
important role in the New Deal cases, just as it would in subsequent decades.141
Indeed, it was by proclaiming the neutrality of the First Amendment that the Court
was able to distinguish its activism on behalf of free speech from the by-then much
reviled activism of the Lochner Court.142 By insisting that what the First
140
The difficulties the Court faced when, in the wake of Chaplinsky, it attempted to define what
constituted the “well-defined and narrowly limited” category of speech which was obscenity are of
course by now almost legendary. See David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation
of Sexual Expression, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 111-12 (1994). But it was not only with respect to
obscenity that the Court proved incapable for many years of coming up with a definition that
provided litigants with predictable rules; the Court’s fighting words jurisprudence in the 1940s and
1950s was similarly muddled and contentious. See for example Justice Jackson’s vigorous dissents
in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 26, 28 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting) and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
317-318 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This Court's prior decisions, as well as its decisions today,
will be searched in vain for clear standards by which it does, or lower courts should, distinguish
legitimate speaking from that acknowledged to be outside of constitutional protection. . . What
evidences that a street speech is so provocative, insulting or inciting as to be outside of constitutional
immunity from community interference? Is it determined by the actual reaction of the hearers? Or
is it a judicial appraisal of the inherent quality of the language used? Or both?”). See also Ruth
McGaffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQUETTE L. REV. 39 (1984) (noting the
Court’s difficulty during this period in reconciling its various fighting words cases).
141
The term “content-neutral” only first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in 1976, although
it appeared in the scholarly literature earlier than that. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S.
50, 84-85 (1976) (Stewart J., dissenting); Nicholas Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications
of Anti Trust Policy for Television Programming Content, 8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 11, 17 (1970).
142
See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 314 (1996) (“One feature of the Lochner
decision that made it notorious for Progressive critics was its embrace of the doctrine of "liberty of
contract.’…[M]odernist critics concluded that it functioned simply as a tool that judges could
employ to invalidate statutes that they felt threatened the idealized domain of unregulated economic
activity.”); Barry Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1407 n. 102 (2001) (noting that many contemporary commentators
“insisted that judges were pawning off their own views, inevitably conservative ones, as the meaning
of the Constitution”).

35

Amendment absolutely prohibited was efforts by the government to repress speech
merely because it disliked it, the Court was able to depict the First Amendment as
a guardian of democracy, rather than a threat to it.143 The First Amendment
protected democracy, the New Deal cases insist, by preventing the government
from unfairly intervening in democratic debates and, more generally, by defending
democratic diversity and difference against governmental efforts to repress it. As
the Court put it, in Cantwell: “The essential characteristic of the[] liberties
[guaranted by the First Amendment] is, that under their shield many types of life,
character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.”144
Epithets and insults could be prohibited without violating this fundamental First
Amendment principle, Cantwell suggested, because by “incit[ing] violence and
breaches of the peace,” those who used speech of this sort attempted “to deprive
others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties.”145 Chaplinsky made
clear, however, that what was excluded from First Amendment protection was not
merely coercive and directly inciting speech but also speech that caused injury
merely because it violated dominant social norms. As such, the opinion, to a degree
that Cantwell did not, appeared to undermine the idea of the First Amendment as a
“shield” for democratic diversity and difference.
It was in this context that the Court proclaimed a continuity with the past that
did not in fact exist. It is difficult to know whether the Court did so deliberately.
Nothing in Justice Murphy’s notes from the case say anything about this aspect of
the opinion.146 Nevertheless, the text suggests that the justice was, at the very least,
uninterested in the historical truth of the matter.
Indeed, as support for the paragraph in which he asserted the historical
provenance of the exception for fighting words, obscene and profane speech and
libel, Murphy cited no eighteenth or nineteenth-century case law or treatises.147
Instead, he cited primarily two authorities. The first was Cantwell v. Connecticut.148
The second was a passage from Zechariah Chafee’s recently published Free Speech
in the United States in which Chafee explained why, on his view, laws that punished
seditious speech were unconstitutional but laws that targeted “obscenity, profanity,
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and gross libels upon individuals” were not.149 Chafee argued that the former were
unconstitutional because they violated a central purpose of the First Amendment,
which was to encourage the spread of political truth. The latter, in contrast, did not.
Chafee explained:
[T]hese verbal peace-time crimes . . . are too well-recognized to
question their constitutionality, but I believe that if properly limited
they fall outside the protection of the free speech clauses as I have
defined them. My reason is not that they existed at common law
before the constitutions, for a similar argument would apply to the
crime of sedition, which was abolished by the First Amendment. . . .
The true explanation is that profanity and indecent talk and pictures,
which do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a
very slight social value as a step toward truth, which is clearly
outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of
the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see.150
Justice Murphy borrowed a great deal from this passage in constructing his
opinion in Chaplinsky, as is evident from the opinion’s text. Nevertheless, there is
a crucial difference between Chafee’s argument and Murphy’s recapitulation of the
argument in Chaplinsky—namely, that Chafee never claimed the distinction he
drew between what he called the “normal” criminal laws of obscenity, profanity,
and libel and the abnormal and unconstitutional sedition statutes was based on
historical practice.
To the contrary: Chafee acknowledged on multiple occasions that in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries lawmakers prosecuted seditious libel just as
they prosecuted obscene or profane speech.151 Chafee also noted that much of what
was previously prosecuted as obscenity, profanity and libel did not in fact have such
“slight social value as a step to truth” that the interests promoted by its suppression
outweighed, on his view, the free speech interests that were harmed.152 Chafee was
in other words critical of existing tradition, deeply so. Nevertheless, he insisted that,
in principle, a distinction could and should be made between certain kinds of
speech-restraining laws and others based on a particular analysis of the value of the
speech they restricted.
It was Murphy’s opinion in Chaplinsky that transformed the theoretical
distinction that Chafee drew between the abnormal and normal criminal laws of
speech into a claim about historical practice. In doing so, the opinion was able to
149
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sidestep at least in part, the problems created by Chafee’s effort to tie the degree of
constitutional protection afforded speech to a judgment of its social value. It did so
by depicting the distinction between high and low-value speech as a product of
longstanding jurisprudential tradition, rather than the perhaps idiosyncratic or
politically-motivated desires and beliefs of the members of the Court.
C. Narrowing the Categories
In Roth and Beauharnais, the Court once again turned to history to justify
denying protection to obscene and libelous speech.153 By claiming the denial of
protection to these categories of speech was “implicit in the history of the First
Amendment,” the Court attempted in these cases to justify what was in fact a very
new conception of constitutional boundaries by obscuring what was so new about
it.154
In practice, however, the Court relied very little on historical precedent to
actually define the low-value categories. Rather than simply adopting the often
extremely broad definitions of obscenity, profanity, and libel that eighteenth and
nineteenth-century courts employed, the Court instead defined each of these
categories much more narrowly, to avoid classifying as low-value any speech
capable of contributing to what in Thornhill v. Alabama it had declared to be of
central First Amendment importance: namely, the public and truthful discussion of
“matters of public concern.”155
Hence in Roth, the Court rejected the broad definition that nineteenth century
courts used to define obscene speech because it found that the nineteenth century
definition included material that meaningfully contributed to discussion about what
the Court described as a “vital problem[] of human interest and public concern”—
namely, sex.156 Instead, the Court adopted the significantly narrower definition of
the obscene that was developed by lower courts in the 1930s specifically in order
to protect medical discourse and works of high art from prosecution.157
For similar reasons, the Court narrowed the category of the profane to exclude
the kind of serious religious debate that in the nineteenth century was prosecuted
as either profanity or blasphemy.158 In Cantwell, and in the subsequent case, Joseph
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Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance -unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion -- have
the full protection of the guaranties . . . [b]ut implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”);
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Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103.
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Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
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Under the test adopted by the Court in Roth, material could not be considered obscene unless
the “dominant theme of the material taken as a whole” appeared “to the average person, applying
contemporary standards . . . [to] appeal[] to [a] prurient interest.” 354 U.S. at 489. This distinguished
it from the nineteenth-century test, which [as the Court put it in Roth] “judge[d] obscenity by the
effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons.” Id.
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Nineteenth-century courts did not tend to distinguish the crime of blasphemy from the crime
of profanity. Hence, defendants could be prosecuted for profanity both when they called into
question the existence of the deity or the sanctity of the Scriptures and when they used offensive
and insulting language that happened to include the words “God” or “damn” etc. 4 See, e.g.,
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Burstyn v. Wilson, the Court made clear that speech could not be prosecuted as
either profane or blasphemous merely because it violated dominant social norms of
piety, or expressed an unpopular view of religion or the divine.159
Meanwhile, after first embracing a very broad interpretation of what counted as
low-value libelous speech in Beauharnais v. Illinois,160 the Court sharply
constricted liability for libel when it held in New York Times v. Sullivan that public
officials could receive damages for defamatory falsehoods about them only if they
could show that the falsehoods were made with actual malice, and not the result of
negligence.161 In later decisions, the Court extended the rule to cases involving
public figures.162 In so doing, the Court more or less constitutionalized the
nineteenth-century doctrine of qualified privilege.163 The justifications the Court
provided for limiting what kind of speech could be subject to liability for
defamation absent any significant constitutional concern was not, however, that
doing so was mandated by longstanding tradition.164 Instead, the Court argued that
no other rule would effectively safeguard the “unalienable right” of the individual

Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 398 (affirming the conviction of a defendant prosecuted for
“wilfully, premeditatedly, and despitefully blasphem[ing] and [speaking] loosely and profanely of
Almighty God, Christ, Jesus, the Holy Spirit” after he called the existence of god into question
during a public debate); Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 375 (1831) (affirming the conviction of a
defendant prosecuted for “profane cursing and swearing” after he hurled “imprecations of future
divine vengeance upon [a] magistrate”); Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N.J.L. 1 (1837) (affirming the
conviction of a defendant heard to “swear thirty-three profane oaths in these words, to wit “By
God &c”).
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Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“[F]rom the standpoint of freedom of
speech and the press . . . the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them . . . . It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or
imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches,
or motion pictures.”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (“In the realm of religious faith, and in that of
political belief, sharp differences arise. . . . To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader,
as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent
in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”).
160
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266-267 (construing state statute that prohibited the distribution
of exhibit of “any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which . . . exposes the citizens
of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy” as a kind of group libel to
which First Amendment protections did not apply). The Beauharnais Court did note that it retained
its authority “to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of
punishing libel.” Id. at 263-64. Nevertheless, the opinion suggested that even speech that touched
overtly on “matters of public concern”—for example, by commenting negatively on contemporary
racial relations—could be prohibited when libelous without raising any First Amendment concerns.
As Robert Cover noted, some years later, the Beauharnais represented the Court’s attempt to “purify
. . . our political discourse”—albeit an attempt that was soon abandoned. Robert M. Cover, The
Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287, 1311 (1982).
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-272 (1964).
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Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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See infra notes __, and accompanying text.
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The Court in fact acknowledged that speech of this sort had been prosecuted in the eighteenth
century, under the Sedition Act of 1798, but argued that its prosecution reflected a poor
understanding of the original meaning of the First Amendment. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
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to disseminate his or her opinion on matters of public interest without fear of
persecution.165
The Court also did not rely upon history to identify new categories of low-value
speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, in 1942, for example, the Court dismissed the
possibility that any First Amendment protection extended to commercial
advertising.166 The opinion, although short and therefore somewhat enigmatic,
suggested that the Court reached the conclusion that advertising lay outside the
sphere of constitutional concern not because it was historically mandated but
because advertising contained information of only private interest. 167 In later cases,
the Court extended significantly more constitutional protection to speech of this
sort, although advertising remained low-value in the sense that it could be regulated
more strictly than other kinds of speech.168 The justifications the Court provided
for extending greater protection to speech of this sort were once again functional,
rather than historical. Specifically, the Court pointed to the importance of
advertising as a medium for communicating to the public information relevant both
to political debates and economic decision-making.169 The Court extended greater
protection to advertising, in other words, because it recognized the valuable
contribution it made to the public discussion of public matters.170
Meanwhile, the Court recognized as high-value many kinds of speech that in
the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were regularly sanctioned
and/or subject to prior restraint. It held, for example, that newspaper reports about
public trials could only be prosecuted for contempt upon a showing of clear and
present danger, given their obvious public importance.171 The Court reached this
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in a
forceful dissent, in doing so it enacted a “sudden break with the uninterrupted
course of constitutional history.”172 The Court also extended full protection to
motion pictures, notwithstanding its earlier conclusion that motion pictures were
not press for constitutional purposes. The Court did so because it recognized the
165
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Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
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Indeed, the Court held that the advertisements at issue in the case could be prohibited without
violating the First Amendment because, unlike political speech, they concerned only “what is of
private profit” rather than “what is of public interest.” Id. at 55.
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Stone, supra note _, at 194.
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Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763
(1976) (noting that individuals, as well as “society . . . may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information” and that “[e]ven an individual advertisement, though entirely
‘commercial,’ may be of general public interest”).
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The Court justified commercial advertising’s continuing low-value status, meanwhile, by
pointing to specific features of the speech: namely, its comparatively greater verifiability and its
hardiness. Id. at 772. Here too, functional rather than historical considerations, dominated the
analysis. Indeed, the Court explicitly based its analysis of the constitutional status of commercial
advertising in the “commonsense differences” that distinguished speech of this sort from other kinds
of (high-value) speech and that led the Court to conclude that it could be more strictly regulated. Id.
171
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 186, 270-271 (1941) (concluding that allowing the
prosecution of speech of this sort when it possessed merely a “bad tendency” of undermining the
administration of justice would “remove from the arena of public discussion . . . the controversies
that command most interest”).
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Id. at 279 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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capacity of motion pictures to “affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”173 The Court
extended high-value status to movies, in other words, because it found them capable
of contributing, both directly and indirectly to public debate about public matters.
These cases demonstrate how little the Court actually relied upon history to
distinguish low from high-value speech. Instead it employed what we might
describe as a “purpose-based” approach: one that identified low-value speech by
looking at whether its content-based regulation threatened to undermine the goals
the First Amendment was intended to advance.174 Chief among these purposes, as
Roth, Sullivan, and the other low-value cases make clear, was protecting against
government interference the public debate on matters of public concern that the
Court now identified as of core First Amendment importance.
History nevertheless continued to provide the theoretical justification for
denying protection to offensive or otherwise immoral speech. At least, the Court
continued to invoke the Chaplinsky dicta that low-value speech was speech “the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem” when it needed to explain why it was, for example, that
child pornography could be entirely prohibited even when it was not obscene, or
why it was that the government could prosecute what the Court called “true threats”
but not other kinds of speech.175
In Stevens in 2010, the Court also cited this passage as support for its conclusion
that the only content-based regulations of speech that are ordinarily permissible
under the First Amendment are those that target what it called simply “historically
unprotected” speech.176 In its emphasis on the historical basis of the low-value
categories, Stevens makes clear the continuing importance of the myth of low-value
speech to First Amendment doctrine today. It also, however, illuminates the serious
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Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
Certainly this is what observers believed at the time. See Stone, supra note _, at 194 (noting
that “[t]he precise factors that the Court considers” when identifying low-value speech “remain
somewhat obscure” but that in general the Court focuses “on the extent to which the speech furthers
the historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the first amendment”); Cass
Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555, 558 (1989) (construing the
distinction between high and low-value speech as a distinction “between categories of speech [based
upon] . . . their centrality to the purposes of the free speech guarantee”).
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Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754; Black, 538 U.S. at 359. True threats are “statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or a group of individuals.” Id. The category as such does not
include threatening language that operates as political hyperbole, or threats that are not made
seriously. It includes more, however, than simply language that poses a clear and present danger of
harm. As the Court made clear in Virginia v. Black, language can be prosecuted as a true threat even
when the speaker does not actually intend to carry out the threat. Id. at 360. Like many of the other
categories of low-value speech, by designating true threats as outside the scope of constitutional
protection, the Court has allowed the government to continue to regulate speech when it threatens
intangible harm—in this case, the “fear of violence” engendered by the communication of true
threats—even when it does not in fact pose an imminent threat of serious danger to person or
property. Id.
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problems created by the Court’s continuing reliance on what is essentially a false
view of First Amendment history—as the next Part explores.
IV.

REINVENTING THE DOCTRINE

In Stevens, the Court essentially reinvented the doctrine of low-value speech
when it held that the only content-based regulations that are not presumptively
invalid under the First Amendment are those that target speech that either falls into
a “previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech” or
constitutes a “category of speech that ha[s] been historically unprotected, but ha[s]
not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in [the] case law.”177 The
Court claimed that, in holding that novel categories of low-value speech could be
identified only on the basis of evidence showing a “long-settled tradition of
subjecting that speech to regulation,” it was doing nothing new; that it was merely
making what was previously implicit in the doctrine explicit.178 It acknowledged
that there was language in the earlier cases to support the government’s alternative
interpretation of Chaplinsky as establishing a balancing test that required courts to
weigh the expressive value of speech against its social costs.179 Nevertheless, it
insisted that in practice, it had always “grounded its analysis” of the low-value
categories in historical considerations.180
In fact, as the previous Part makes clear, the Court had not always grounded its
analysis of the low-value categories in history. As the example of commercial
speech illustrates, historical considerations played no role in the Court’s analysis of
at least some of the categories of low-value speech.
Prior to Stevens, the Court had also never held that the only content-based
regulations of speech that are generally permissible under the First Amendment are
those that target low-value or what the Court now described simply as historically
unprotected speech. To the contrary: the Court had affirmed on multiple occasions
the constitutionality of content-based regulations that imposed sometimes
significant restrictions on high-value speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association, for example, in 1978, it affirmed the constitutionality of laws that
restricted “the exchange of information about securities” and imposed contentbased restrictions on “corporate proxy statements.”181 In other decisions, it affirmed
the constitutionality of labor laws that absolutely restricted the right of unions to
engage in certain kinds of strikes and boycotts.182 The Court also upheld provisions
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Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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See e.g, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982)
(upholding ban on secondary boycotting on the grounds that neither secondary pickets or boycotts
constitute protected activity); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,
616 (1980) (Upholding a ban on secondary picketing on the grounds that “[s]uch picketing spreads
labor discord by coercing a neutral party to join the fray”). As Julias Getman noted, the Court’s
approach to the First Amendment issues involved in these cases was markedly different than the
much more stringent approach it took to restrictions on picketing and boycotts outside the union
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in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that imposed civil liability on the use
of language to create a hostile work environment on the basis of race and sex.183
In none of these cases were the regulations justified—to the extent they were
justified—by recourse to history. Instead, courts pointed to context-specific
features of the speech targeted by these laws to explain why its regulation was
permissible even absent a showing that it served a compelling government purpose
and was narrowly tailored to that end. In most cases, the justifications were
pragmatic. Courts justified regulations that restricted the “exchange of information
about securities,” for example, by pointing to the importance of such regulations to
the government’s ability to effectively regulate the securities market.184 The Court
justified the ban on secondary boycotts and picketing, meanwhile, by invoking the
necessity of maintaining the “delicate balance” established by the labor laws
between the rights of workers and the rights of disinterested third parties.185 In their
variability, these cases point to what Steve Schiffrin once described as the
“eclectic[ism]” of modern free speech law.186
Stevens thus signals a marked shift away from this more eclectic approach to
questions of First Amendment coverage, and towards a much more rigorous
application of the two-tier framework for the review of content-based regulations
of speech. By taking the historical claims made by the Chaplinsky Court much more
seriously than the New Deal Court did itself—by insisting, as the New Deal Court
did not, that historically unprotected speech is the only kind of speech that may be
regulated on the basis of its content without triggering grave constitutional
concern— the decision makes it significantly more difficult for the government to
justify laws of this kind. It also, of course, makes history much more important to
the analysis than was previously true.
That the Stevens rule ultimately rests on a false view of history calls into
question whether the changes it brings to the doctrine are good ones.

context. Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43
MD. L. REV. 4 (1984)
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In Harris v. Forklift, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) for example, the Court
upheld the award of damages under this provision of Title VII to an employer who used sexually
harassing language without once mentioning the possibility that the provision might violate the First
Amendment prohibition on content-based speech regulations. This was the case notwithstanding the
fact that First Amendment issues were extensively argued in the briefs. See Richard Fallon, Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment: The Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 9-10 (1994).
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See, e.g., SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Where
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or indirectly to sell securities were totally protected, any regulation of the securities market would
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Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251 (1983).
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A. Problems of Justification
Indeed, the history detailed in the previous two Parts undermines both of the
arguments the Stevens Court made to justify the new test: namely that, by requiring
evidence of a long-settled tradition of regulation whenever the government seeks
to enact a content-based regulation of speech that does not fall into an existing lowvalue category, the test ensures that First Amendment doctrine remains faithful to
an original understanding of what speech is and is not “worth” protecting and
thereby limits the ability of judges to deny protection to speech merely because they
dislike it or believe it to lack value.
A Poor Test of Originalism
First, it makes clear that the Stevens test does not in fact ensure that the doctrine
remains faithful to an original understanding of freedom of speech, even assuming
that a well-developed understanding of this sort existed at the time and that it can
be deciphered via the post-Ratification practice of courts and legislatures.187 To the
contrary. By requiring courts to extend full First Amendment protection to
everything that we would today consider speech for constitutional purposes except
when the government can affirmatively point to a long-settled tradition of
regulating speech of this sort, the test strictly limits when and how the government
can regulate even subversive, immoral, or otherwise plainly dangerous speech. It
thus establishes a constitutional regime of speech regulation that looks nothing like
that which existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.188
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There is good reason to doubt that a well-developed understanding of this sort existed in the
late eighteenth-century. As Leonard Levy has noted, “freedom [of speech] had almost no history as
a concept or a practice prior to the [ratification of the] First Amendment or even later. It developed
as an offshoot of freedom of the press, on the one hand, and on the other, freedom of religion – the
freedom to speak openly on religious matters. But as an independent concept referring to a citizen’s
personal right to speak his mind, freedom of speech was a very late development, virtually a new
concept without basis in everyday experience and nearly unknown to legal and constitutional history
or to libertarian thought on either side of the Atlantic prior to the First Amendment.” LEONARD
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 6 (1985).
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For this reason, although Justice Thomas—perhaps the member of the Court most committed
to an originalist methodology when it comes to First Amendment questions—joined the Stevens
majority, he has subsequently expressed strong disapproval with the results the Stevens test achieves.
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, for example, Justice Thomas argued that the
majority was wrong when it concluded that a California law that prohibited the sale of violent video
games to minors was unconstitutional. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas J., dissenting). After
engaging in a thorough examination of the historical evidence when it came to the regulation of
speech addressed to minors, Justice Thomas concluded that the “Court’s decision . . . does not
comport with the original public meaning of the First Amendment” because the original
understanding of freedom of speech “does not include a right to speak to minors . . . without going
through the minors’ parents or guardians.” Id. In Alvarez, Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s
dissent, which expressed similar reservations with the plurality’s conclusion about the constitutional
status of knowing false statements of fact. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2560-62 (Alito J., dissenting). These
dissents make clear how poorly the rule tracks what an originalist would call the “public meaning”
of freedom of speech in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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A Poor Constraint on Judicial Discretion
The fact that the distinction between high and low-value speech is a product of
the twentieth century, rather than a longstanding feature of the regulation of speech
in the United States, also calls into question how effective the Stevens test will be
in preventing judges from imposing their own values onto the Constitution.
The test might significantly limit judicial discretion were it in fact the case that
the historical record discloses “well-defined” and “narrowly limited” categories of
low-value speech that eighteenth and nineteenth century courts treated qualitatively
differently from other kinds of speech. In that case, even if it didn’t ensure fidelity
to the original meaning of freedom of speech, the rule could nevertheless restrict
the ability of courts to impose their own values onto the Constitution by forcing
them to abide by the categorical distinctions that earlier courts employed.
The historical record does not, however, include well-defined and narrowlylimited classes of this kind. Instead, it reveals a plethora of what we today would
call content-based regulations of speech—many of which applied to high-value
speech, not merely to low.189 The complexity of the historical record means that,
even leaving aside the question of original meaning, the task of determining
whether a sufficient tradition of prohibition exists to classify a particular kind of
speech as of low-value will in many cases be a difficult and highly-subjective
endeavor and one whose outcome will depend in large part on how the court
constructs the relevant categories.
This becomes evident when one looks at how the Court has interpreted and
applied Stevens in recent cases. Consider for example the most recent opinion in
which the Court applied the Stevens test, United States v. Alvarez. Alvarez, involved
a challenge to the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime to knowingly lie about
having received a military honor or award.190 A plurality of the Court found that
the speech the Act restricted—namely, false statements of fact—was not
historically unprotected because, although courts and legislatures have traditionally
imposed sanctions on many kinds of false speech, there is no historical tradition in
the United States of prosecuting the act of lying when that lie is unconnected to
some other, legally cognizable harm, “such as the invasion of privacy, or the costs
of vexatious litigation.”191
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To give just a few examples of what I mean by this, the following is a list of some of the
speech-related common law causes of action for nuisance listed in an 1893 treatise: disturbing public
rest on the Lord’s day by conspicuous secular labor; indulging in gross and scandalous profanity;
indulging in habitual, open, and notorious lewdness (which the author noted could include the
display of “a picture of a man naked to the waist, and covered with eruptive sores, so as to constitute
an exhibition offensive and disgusting” even though “there is nothing immoral or indecent in the
picture”) scolding; brawling; eavesdropping; publishing false alarms, or intelligence calculated to
disturb the peace of the community. H.G. WOOD THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 2384, 2385, 2391 (1893).
The task of translating these offenses into a contemporary context, or interpreting what it means vis
a vis freedom of speech, is by no means a simple one. It certainly cannot be said that the First
Amendment allows the government to prohibit all of these (expressive as well as nonexpressive)
acts; nor is it likely that that is what the Court would understand it to mean.
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The plurality was certainly correct on this point. Indeed, it was widely
recognized in the nineteenth century that lying was not by itself an actionable
offense under either the common law or the various statutes that governed false
representations.192
It is far from clear, however, why this undoubtedly true fact about the historical
tradition of regulating falsity in the United States led the plurality to conclude that
statements like those prohibited by the Stolen Valor Act do not fall within a
“historic and traditional” category of exception. As the Court itself acknowledged,
the Stolen Valor Act was not in fact intended to prosecute falsity per se. Instead,
the Act was intended by Congress to criminalize lying that resulted, if not
necessarily in material harm to the government or the public, then in reputational
harm to the Armed Services.193 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that
nineteenth or at least early-twentieth century courts and legislators saw nothing
amiss in punishing false statements of fact that threatened this kind of intangible
harm. For example, someone who falsely claimed to be speaking on behalf of the
Government could be criminally punished under a federal statute passed in 1909
that prohibited the impersonation of government officers even absent any evidence
that his or her speech caused financial or property loss. This was because his or her
speech was understood to cause intrinsic harm to “the general good repute and
dignity” of government service.194 In the nineteenth century, meanwhile, the
“spreading of false alarm” was a common law offense. The cognizable harm it
created was, of course, the harm to the public order of the community.195
It was thus only by construing the relevant category extremely broadly—to
include all false statements of fact, even those that do not appear to lead to any
“cognizable legal harm”—that the Alvarez plurality was able to conclude that false
statements of fact like those targeted by the Stolen Valor Act were not historically
unprotected. That the Court could construe the relevant category in this way—that
it could, in other words, determine the terms of the analysis, and in so doing,
determine its result—suggests how manipulable the Stevens test can be, given the
failure of the historical record to clearly demarcate categories of low-value speech
that need not be created, merely discovered. Nor is this the only example of serious
ambiguity in the Court’s delimitation of the categories.
Stevens itself demonstrates how much can depend upon how the Court
construes the relevant categories of analysis. The case, recall, involved a First
Amendment challenge to a federal statute that criminalized the creation, sale, and

See, e.g., Ramey v. Thornberry, 46 Ky. 475, 475 (1847) (“To charge a person in general
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1829 WL 2287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (“[N]o action could be supported for telling a bare, naked lie;
that is, saying a thing which is false, without any intention to injure, cheat or deceive another
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193
Stolen Valor Act, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 3266 (identifying as the purpose of the Act to prevent the
dilution of “the reputation and meaning of military decorations and medals” and thereby ensure their
continuing efficacy as symbols of accomplishment, and mechanisms for the fostering of collective
morale and individual ambition”).
194
United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915).
195
WOOD, supra note _, at § 2391.
192

46

possession of visual or auditory images of animal cruelty when the conduct
depicted in those images occurred in violation of federal or state law.196
The Court concluded that the speech regulated by the statute—a category it
described as “depictions of animal cruelty”—was not historically unprotected,
given the absence of any evidence demonstrating the existence of a long-settled
tradition of regulating speech of this kind.197 And indeed, as the majority pointed
out, there is no evidence that eighteenth or nineteenth century courts prosecuted
speech that depicted cruelty to animals.198
A good argument can be made, however—indeed, Justice Alito made it in his
dissent—that even if depictions of cruelty to animals do not constitute a novel
category of historically unprotected speech, they nevertheless fit into the
established “historic and traditional” category of speech integral to crime.199 In New
York v. Ferber, the Court concluded that child pornography was a kind of speech
integral to crime because “[t]he advertising and selling of child pornography
provide[s] an economic motive for and [is] thus an integral part of the production
of . . . an activity illegal throughout the Nation.”200 Like child pornography, the
depictions of animal cruelty that the federal statute prohibited created a marked for,
and thereby incentivized, “activity illegal throughout the Nation.”201
Given the facts of the cases, it is difficult to reconcile the holdings in Ferber
and Stevens. Yet, the Stevens majority provided no hint as to how they might be
distinguished. Instead, it entirely ignored the possibility that the speech at issue in
the case might qualify as speech integral to crime and concentrated all of its
attention on the separate question of whether depictions of cruelty to animal
constituted a novel category of historically unprotected speech (they do not).
Although it may be theoretically possible to distinguish Ferber and Stevens in
some way, the Court’s complete inattention to the problem suggests how
unpredictable, even perhaps incoherent, the historical test can be in actual practice,
given the difficulty of determining at what level of generality it should be
applied.202 This leaves, obviously, a great deal of room for value judgments to
intrude into the analysis, albeit in cloaked form.
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either kind of statute largely disappears. Just as there is no tradition of regulating speech about
cruelty to animals, there is no tradition in the United States of specifically prohibiting child
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B. Costs of the Rule
The fact that the Stevens rule relies on a false view of history means that it
achieves neither of the benefits the Court has claimed for it. Meanwhile, the test
imposes serious costs.
For one thing, by requiring courts to justify decisions about low-value speech
in historical terms, it forces whatever value-judgments may in fact motivate these
decisions to remain silent and hidden. It thus undermines the transparency of
judicial decisionmaking that helps limit the anti-majoritarian power of the courts
by making their reasoning vulnerable to popular critique.
To the extent judges employ it in good faith, the test also ensures that decisions
about the constitutional status of speech depend, ultimately, on factors—such as,
for example, how the court defines the relevant categories, and whether eighteenth
and nineteenth century legislatures happened to regulate a particular kind of
speech—that are not only hard to predict in advance but also, from a constitutional
perspective, quite irrelevant. Whether a court construes the relevant categories
broadly or narrowly tells us little or nothing about whether the speech in question
is or is not “worthy” of constitutional protection, or would have been considered so
at the time.
Of course, this is in some sense what the Court crafted the rule in order to
achieve. The assumption underlying the decision, however, was that by forcing
judges to base their decisions about the constitutional status of speech on historical
evidence, rather than their own conception of the constitutional value of the speech
in question, the rule would allow an original, or at least traditional, understanding
of constitutional value to control. Absent that kind of animating understanding, the
formalism of the Stevens rule is very unattractive—particularly since one of its
likely consequences will be to make it much more difficult for the government to
regulate speech in new ways.
Consider for example the vexed question of the First Amendment status of
information. In 2011, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Court addressed a First
Amendment challenge to a Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies from sharing
information about doctors’ prescribing practices with marketers.203 Although the
Court ultimately struck the law down on other grounds, it noted in passing that there
is a “strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First
Amendment purposes.”204 Indeed, in a number of previous cases, the Court had
concluded that certain kinds of information—information on beer labels,

pornography. The category is a very new one. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child
Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 218 (2001) (noting that “[a] decade prior to [New York v.]
Ferber, child pornography was an unknown genre”); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 311 (1982) (“[T]he phenomenon of
child pornography is so new that it would have been impossible to predict even ten years ago.”).
203
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)
204
Id. at 2667.
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information in the form of a credit report—counted as speech under the First
Amendment, albeit not always high-value speech.205
In a future case, the Court thus may well find that personal information of the
sort at issue in Sorrell is speech for First Amendment purposes. This is not
inherently problematic.206 It does however raise the question of what level of
protection speech of this sort should receive. The analysis is potentially a complex
one, given on the one hand the tremendous value that information of this sort
possesses, and on the other hand, the serious threat that its circulation and
unregulated disclosure might pose to individual privacy.207
Under the Stevens rule, however, the only inquiry that matters is historical:
namely, can courts discern a long-settled tradition of regulating speech of this sort?
But why should it matter whether eighteenth and nineteenth century legislatures
passed rules to restrict the disclosure of speech of this kind? Given how recently
the technology to store personal information on a mass scale emerged, the absence
of a tradition of regulating speech of this kind tells us very little about whether
courts and legislatures would have believed it constitutionally permissible to do
so.208 All it tells us is that the problem of information disclosure had not yet
emerged as something legislatures and courts had to concern themselves with. And
yet, under Stevens, it seems almost certain that, were the Court to recognize
personal information as speech (a far from unlikely prospect), it would have to
205
See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985) (plurality). More generally, in its
commercial speech cases, the Court has long emphasized the First Amendment importance of the
information that advertisements convey. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-64 (“Advertising,
however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So
long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.”).
206
As Ashutosh Bhagwat notes there are entire industries organized around the collection and
dissemination of information of this and similar sorts. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health:
Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 864 (2012). To say that such
information is not speech would be to leave these industries entirely unprotected against government
efforts to restrict their expressive activities. Id. (arguing that such a result would “create an absurdly
large and dangerous hole in the protections granted by the First Amendment”). This seems obviously
problematic.
207
As Bhagwat notes, were the Court to recognize personal information as speech, the ruling
could implicate not only data on individual physician prescribing practices but “personal medical
information in the possession of health care providers; financial information in the possession of
financial institutions; purchasing histories in the possession of retailers, including online retailers
such as Amazon.com; search information in the possession of search engines such as Google;
viewing information in the possession of firms such as Comcast and Netflix; and any number of
other forms of personal data that individuals voluntarily share with private-sector firms.” Id. at 868.
For a cogent argument about the threat to privacy that the disclosure of information of this sort
poses, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000).
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See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note _, at 1472-1501 (tracing the recent transformations in how
and how much personal information is gathered and retained); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 969-70 (2003)
(same).
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conclude that such speech was high value and could only be regulated in accordance
with the demanding standards of strict scrutiny.
In practice, what this would mean is to threaten the government’s ability to
restrict the disclosure of many kinds of personal information.209 Although
restrictions on the disclosure of personal medical information might survive strict
scrutiny, it is much less likely that laws that prohibit the disclosure of other kinds
of information would. 210 Certainly in the past the Court has held that the First
Amendment prevents the government from limiting or imposing liability on the
disclosure of truthful information in order to protect personal privacy.211 It is hard
to believe that the Court will find that laws restricting the disclosure of information
about an individual’s buying habits, or credit history, or video rental records serve
a compelling state interest when it has not found that laws restricting the disclosure
of, for example, information about a rape victim, or a juvenile defendant, do. Yet it
is difficult to see what First Amendment interests are harmed by such laws. In
contrast to the earlier cases, the information targeted by privacy laws of this sort is
usually not already in the public domain, or likely to end up there. Restricting its
circulation does not therefore appear to undermine public debate on matters of
public concern.212 Nor does information of this sort appear sufficiently important
to the search for truth, or the individual right to autonomy to preclude any
restrictions on its disclosure.213 Certainly by forcing courts’ attention exclusively
on historical considerations, the Stevens test provides no opportunity for courts to
investigate whether or not restricting the disclosure of information of this kind does
in fact threaten any important First Amendment interests.
Privacy laws are not the only kinds of laws that are threatened by the Stevens
test. So too are the various labor, securities, and civil rights laws described above.
Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts did not, after all, regularly sanction
sexually harassing speech, or restrict speech about public securities, save for some

See Solove, supra note _, at 970 (noting the “panoply of federal and state statutes that limit
disclosures of personal data [including] . . . information from school records, cable company records,
video rental records, motor vehicle records, and health records”).
210
See Bhagwat, supra note _, at 871-72 (“It seems beyond peradventure that individuals'
interests in maintaining the secrecy of their financial transactions, or their personal health history,
qualify as compelling” but concluding that it is much less likely that the interest in maintaining
personal privacy about other kinds of information would); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66
STAN. L. REV. 57, 112-14 (2014) (arguing that under heightened scrutiny the medical provisions in
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and
other federal laws should be struck down).
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See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (invalidating a
Virginia statute that imposed criminal punishment for publishing truthful information about
confidential proceedings); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 309 (1977) (striking down
a pretrial order that enjoined the news media from publishing the name or picture of a child); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (holding that a state may not allow damages for
an invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim).
212
See Solove, supra note _, at 984.
213
As Daniel Solove points out, laws restricting the disclosure of personal information in fact
vindicate an important autonomy interest; that of the individual to control the disclosure of
information about him or herself. Solove, supra note _, at 990-91.
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limited regulation of fraud.214 And although there is a considerably longer history
of regulating strikes and boycotts, this history extends for the most part only to the
late nineteenth century.215 The fact that the Court has not specified how long a
history of regulation must be to qualify as “long-settled” means that Stevens could
be interpreted so as to avoid conflicting with these or any other by-now familiar
regulatory schemes. The originalist language in the opinion suggests, however, that
by a long-settled tradition of regulation, what the Court means is a tradition
extending back to the eighteenth century, or as close to it as seems capable of
illuminating original understandings.
Assuming therefore that what a “long-settled tradition of regulation means is a
tradition that extends into the nineteenth and even perhaps eighteenth centuries,
Stevens calls the constitutionality of all of these laws into serious question. Again,
however, it is not clear that it should. Certainly the fact that eighteenth and
nineteenth century legislatures did not regulate the speech of public companies, or
prohibit the use of sexually harassing speech, or prohibit secondary boycotts, does
not mean that they would have considered prohibitions of this sort to be
unconstitutional. Nor does it mean that we should do so today.
There are, of course, critics of these laws who argue that they violate the First
Amendment and should therefore be struck down.216 The arguments made against
these laws do not, however, tend to rely upon history. Instead, critics of these laws
argue that they are unconstitutional because they impede important First
Amendment interests and goals.217 What is problematic about the Stevens test is
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Jolynn Childers, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of
Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 859 (1993)
(noting that “sexual harassment was recognized as a legitimate cause of action under Title VII in
1976”). Even then, most lost. Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49
STAN. L. REV. 691, 698-701 (1997). For a detailed history of securities regulation in the United
States in the mid-nineteenth century see STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES
REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860 (1998).
215
WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 59-60
(noting that “in 1900 strikes to improve wages and working conditions were clearly legal, as they
had been virtually throughout the century” and that “[b]efore the 1890s, courts had barely considered
the legal status of many kinds of boycotting activities”); Herbert Hovenkamp, "Labor Conspiracies
in American Law, 1880-1930," 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 922 (1988) (“[N]o American case before the
1890s condemned laborers for the simple act of combining in order to increase wages”).
216
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1845-55 (1992) (arguing that at least some of the speech restricted by Title VII
restrictions on harassing language deserves First Amendment protection); Cynthia Estlund,
Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 687 (1996) (same); Getman, supra note _, at 21 (arguing that the laws prohibiting unions
from engaging in secondary boycotts “resemble[] an intellectual rubble heap” and should be
overturned);Susan B. Heyman, The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities
Regulation and Corporate Free Speech, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 189, 211-12 (2013) (arguing that securities
regulation that prohibit the disclosure of truthful information violate the First Amendment when
assessed under strict scrutiny or the intermediate scrutiny afforded commercial speech).
217
Volokh, supra note _, at 1855-56 (critiquing the antidemocratic implications of hostile
workplace laws that allow speech to be restricted because of its political content); Heyman,
supra note _, at 224 (arguing that limiting the scope of securities regulations would promote market
efficiency as well as aid individual self-expression).
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that, by making the inquiry an exclusively, or at least primarily historical one, the
test deprives courts of any opportunity to determine whether the critics are right.
C. The Problem of Principle
The preceding discussion points to the fundamental problem with the Stevens
rule: namely, that it fails to provide courts with a principled basis for making
determinations about the scope and limits of constitutional protection for speech.
Nor could a historical boundary test like it do so, given the tremendous changes
that have taken place in how courts understand what it means to guarantee freedom
of speech, without entailing a massive reorganization of the constitutional
boundaries that currently exist.
Indeed, were the Court to genuinely attempt to craft a test of First Amendment
boundaries that resulted in a distribution of constitutional protections for speech
that looked anything like that which existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, it would have to either extend protection to the many categories of lowvalue speech that were protected, at least against prior restraint, during this period
or, alternatively, deny protection to the many kinds of high-value speech that were
criminally sanctioned when they posed a threat—even what we would today
consider to be an attenuated threat—to the public order of society. Embracing the
former view of constitutional boundaries would mean essentially doing away with
the doctrine of low-value speech altogether. Embracing the latter view would mean
vesting the government with considerably greater power than it now possesses to
punish speech merely because it dislikes it or believes it improper or immoral.
Neither conception of constitutional boundaries is normatively attractive. The
former threatens to undermine the government’s ability to regulate commercial,
criminal, or other kinds of low-value speech not only when it poses an imminent
danger of serious harm to person or property but when it threatens other, more
intangible but nevertheless important harms (harms to reputation, harms to civility,
harms to public confidence in the marketplace, etc.). The latter conception is
undesirable, of course, because it undermines the central insight of the modern
jurisprudence: namely, that granting government the power to repress speech
merely because it dislikes it threatens democracy, the search for truth, and
individual self-expression.
The Stevens test does not, of course, create either unpalatable scenario. It
preserves the existing low-value categories, notwithstanding their historical
pedigree or lack thereof. It merely imposes a steep bar to the recognition of novel
categories of low-value speech. As a result, what it produces is an ultimately
unprincipled distribution of constitutional protection: one that does not clearly
reflect either an original or a contemporary understanding of freedom of speech, its
purposes, and its limits.
The test consequently threatens both to underprotect speech as well as to
overprotect it. Indeed, the Stevens Court insisted quite forcefully that a
reconsideration of the existing low-value categories was foreclosed by history, just
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as the recognition of novel categories of low-value speech is.218 This is problematic
for many of the same reasons that the Court’s refusal to recognize novel categories
of low-value speech are.
There may after all be good reasons to believe that some categories of lowvalue speech pose a greater threat to First Amendment interests and values than
others do. The exception carved out for obscene speech, for example, is much
harder to square with Cantwell’s stirring ode to the importance of diversity than the
exception carved out for commercial advertising because it appears much more
likely to be used to target those who hold a particular set of beliefs or espouse a
particular viewpoint.219 The content-based regulation of obscenity for that reason
appears to pose a greater threat to the democratic values of the First Amendment
than the regulation of commercial advertising.220
Yet the Stevens framework provides no vocabulary or set of standards courts
can use to evaluate whether the existing categories of low-value speech pose a
threat to democracy, or social progress, or any of the other purposes associated with
the First Amendment. This might be justifiable were it in fact the case that the rule
in fact expressed the principled judgments of the Founders that certain speech
simply didn’t count as speech for constitutional purposes. But absent that, the rule
merely makes immutable the perhaps idiosyncratic, biased, or outdated judgments
reached by earlier courts about the harms that the regulation of low-value speech
such as obscenity threaten. This suggests that even free speech absolutists—those
who might otherwise rally around the Stevens rule because of the steep bar it
imposes on the recognition of novel categories of low-value speech—should be
unhappy with the Court’s insistence on a historical test of First Amendment
boundaries.
D. Embracing Purposes
The problems with the Stevens rule illustrate the dangers of crafting doctrinal
rules that rely, ultimately, upon a false view of the past. By forcing courts to
determine the constitutional value of speech by means of a historical test that does
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (asserting that “the freedom of speech’ referred to by the First
Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard the[] traditional limitations” on the right).
219
An alternative way to express this point is to say that prohibitions against obscenity shade
much closer to impermissible viewpoint discrimination than do many of the other laws the doctrine
of low-value speech makes possible. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions on Speech Because of its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Distinctions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 111-12 (1978)
((arguing that the repression of sexually explicit speech is likely to “have a potent viewpointdifferential impact” because speech of this sort “will almost invariably carry an implicit, if not
explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual mores” and that “[t]o treat such restrictions as
viewpoint-neutral seems simply to ignore reality”); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 122-28 (1996) (arguing that the prohibition against obscene speech is
viewpoint based).
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Of course, even prohibitions on commercial advertising might have viewpoint differential
effects. Pro-consumption advertising is likely to be much more common than advertising expressing
the opposite point of view, for obvious reasons. But the impact is less stark. Ads of the latter
persuasion certainly do exist. See Douglas J. Goodman & Mirelle Cohen, The Consumption of AntiConsumption, in CONSUMER CULTURE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 49-74 (2004).
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not illuminate original understandings of what speech is worth protecting, the rule
threatens to create a set of doctrinal distinctions that rest either on hidden valuejudgments—value-judgments that are as a result very difficult to understand,
engage with, or critique—or are the product of factors that are constitutionally
irrelevant. In so doing, it threatens the very reconciliation between freedom and
order that the Court developed the distinction between high and low-value speech
to achieve by divorcing the distinction between high and low-value speech from
the purposes it was intended to further. Certainly, if applied consistently, the rule
will make it virtually impossible for the government to regulate speech in new
ways. Meanwhile, it forecloses the serious reconsideration of the existing
categories of low-value speech and forces whatever revisions to the categories the
Court comes to believe to be necessary to occur sub rosa, through a narrowing of
categorical definitions.
What these problems suggest is that, however important historical claims may
have been to the initial justification of the doctrine of low-value speech, the Court’s
continuing emphasis on the historical basis of the low-value categories only creates
more problems for the doctrine than it solves. They suggest that First Amendment
doctrine would be better off were the Court to more affirmatively embrace than it
has been willing to do so far the purposive and functionalist, rather than historical,
nature of the distinction between high and low-value speech.
Returning to a purpose-based test like the matters of public concern test the
Court used throughout the twentieth-century to determine the constitutional status
of movies, and commercial advertising, and non-prurient speech about sex would
avoid many of the problems created by the Stevens test. It would ensure much
greater doctrinal transparency by allowing courts to articulate the value-judgments
that in fact inform their decisionmaking. It would also provide courts the flexibility
to recognize novel categories of low-value speech, even when these kinds of speech
did not exist in the eighteenth or nineteenth century or were not, for whatever
reason, a subject of legislative or judicial concern at the time. And of course it
would provide courts with the tools to critically evaluate the merits of the existing
low-value categories.
This is not to say that embracing a purpose-based approach would not pose its
own problems. For one thing, asking courts to determine the constitutional status
of speech by examining the extent to which it furthers the First Amendment’s
purposes would still leave courts a great deal of room to determine the outcome of
the analysis by construing the relevant speech category broadly or narrowly.
Furthermore, the approach requires courts to identify, and agree upon, the purposes
of the First Amendment. At least in the scholarly literature, there is considerable
debate about what these purposes may be.221 And while the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has tended to emphasize primarily the democracy and truth-
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See Kent Greenwalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130-54 (1989)
(outlining the various purposes invoked to justify freedom of speech, including the promotion of
democracy, the advancement of truth, and the safeguarding of individual autonomy). For a good
survey of recent debates about First Amendment purposes see 97 VA. L. REV. 477-680 (2011)
(special issue).
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promoting purposes of the First Amendment,222 these purposes alone do not easily
explain all of the Court’s decisions regarding where and to what kinds of speech
First Amendment protections apply.223 What purposes actually inform the case law
may therefore be considerably harder to discern than one might initially assume.
Neither of these problems are insurmountable, however. Certainly the Court
could, if it wished, articulate much more clearly than it has so far a theory of First
Amendment purposes. It could also develop rules to govern the task of delimiting
the relevant speech categories, similar to those which govern the identification of
fundamental rights in the Fourteenth Amendment context.224 The only thing
stopping the Court from doing so, in fact, is the presumption that underlies the
Stevens test: namely, that the categories of low-value speech have always existed
in something roughly like their contemporary form and that the task of categorical
definition is a relatively simple and objective one (as it clearly is not).
Embracing more affirmatively than the Court has done up until now the
purpose-based nature of the low-value inquiry could therefore do a great deal to
make the analysis of constitutional boundaries both more predictable and more
transparent than it has been to date. Of course, doing so would require the Court to
acknowledge more explicitly than it has been willing to do so far that the principle
of content-neutrality is not in fact as all-encompassing as it has claimed: that both
courts and legislatures retain in fact considerable power to discriminate against
speech because of the message it communicates.
It would also mean vesting judges with considerable discretion to determine
when a particular category of speech does or does not advance the First
Amendment’s purposes. But in this respect a purpose-based test is not inferior to a
historical test like that outlined in Stevens. In both cases, the test grants courts
considerable leeway to determine the constitutional value of the regulated speech.
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James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491 (2011) “[C]ontemporary American free speech doctrine is best
explained as assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern
ourselves… Descriptively, no other theory provides nearly as good an explanation of the actual
pattern of the Supreme Court's free speech decisions.”); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and
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(Arguments from democracy have been said in a comparative study to be the "most influential ... in
the development of twentieth-century free speech law”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:
A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (1984) (noting the influence of the search-for-truth
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See Post, supra note _, at 488; Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech
Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2011); Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation,
and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (2011).
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See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-30 (1989) (arguing that, to determine
whether a liberty interest was “traditionally protected by our society” and therefore protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts should look to the most specific relevant
tradition available). The approach taken by the Court in this case has earned its share of criticism.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Jane Rutherford, Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33-36
(1992). The point is not that the Court should follow the specific approach adopted in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, but that rules for determining the level of generality of analysis can be
developed, and have been developed in other contexts.
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In the former case, however, this discretion is evident, the court’s reasoning and its
conclusions subject to critique. In the latter case, however, the discretion built into
the test is hidden, and therefore much more difficult to understand and to respond
to.
Furthermore, there are ways to constrain judicial discretion under a purposebased approach that would limit, even if not entirely eliminate, the threat of what
the Stevens Court rather derisively called “ad hoc balancing.” Certainly for much
of the twentieth century, the Court did not simply balance what it perceived to be
the expressive value of speech, when considered in light of the First Amendment’s
purposes, against its social costs. Instead, as Part III discussed, it asked whether
speech of a given category was capable of impacting, directly or indirectly, public
debate about “matter[s] of political, social, or other concern to the community.”225
If it was thought to do so, in most cases, the speech received full, or close to full,
First Amendment protection, notwithstanding a long-settled tradition of regulating
speech of this sort.226 If it did not, it tended to be relegated to the status of lowvalue speech and receive little or no constitutional protection.227
The matters of public concern test thus did not require courts to make first-order
judgments of the value of speech per se. Indeed, the Court extended full First
Amendment protection under this test to many kinds of speech that it clearly found
without value.228 This is not to say that judges did not continue to enjoy
considerable freedom under the test to define matters of public concern as they
desired. The Court itself recently acknowledged as much.229 And commentators
have long criticized the test for its lack of standards.230 But the Court’s failure to
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develop explicit rules for when speech touches on matters of public concern may
less be an inherent problem with the test than a consequence of the submerged and
somewhat implicit way in which the test operated in many areas of the law. It may
in other words be yet another casualty of the Court’s reliance on a false view of
First Amendment history. Embracing more affirmatively than the Court has been
willing to do to date the modernity of the distinction between high and low-value
speech could thus help avoid not only the problems of the Stevens test but at least
some of the problems associated with the matters of public concern test itself.
To be sure, the matters of public concern test is not the only purpose-based test
that courts can, or perhaps should, use to distinguish high-value speech from low.
Indeed, the test has a major shortcoming: namely, that it extends no protection to
speech that concerns only private matters. And yet, the fact that speech that touches
on matters of public concern clearly advances one or more of the First
Amendment’s purposes does not mean that speech on private matters doesn’t.231
One can understand the opinions in Alvarez and Sorrell to reflect the desire among
at least some members of the Court to explicitly extend constitutional protection to
private speech of this sort. Certainly, the Alvarez plurality expressed concern that
the Stolen Valor Act might apply not only to public lies but to “personal, whispered
conversations within a home.”232 And personal information of the kind at issue in
Sorrell is not the kind of publicly-oriented expression to which the matters of public
concern test has traditionally applied. There may be good reason therefore to
develop an alternative or additional purpose-based test for distinguishing high from
low-value speech.
The point here is not to specifically identify what purpose-based test the Court
should use to identify low-value categories of speech. It is to note only that a
purpose-based test like the matters of public concern test provides a principled basis
for distinguishing between high and low-value speech. What the history of
constitutional boundary-setting in Parts II and III makes clear is that a historical test
like that developed by the Stevens Court does not provide a principled basis for
making distinctions of this sort.
E. The Irresolvable Conflict
What the history of the doctrine of low-value speech makes clear, in other
words, is that courts cannot avoid the conflict between the doctrine of low-value
speech and the principle of content-neutrality by turning to history. At least they
cannot do so without risking the creation of a set of doctrinal distinctions unmoored
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from any conception of the purposes they are supposed to serve—either those of
the Founders, those of nineteenth century courts, or those of courts today.
This is not to say that courts cannot turn to history to help determine what
purposes the First Amendment was intended to further. Eighteenth and nineteenth
century discourses about freedom of speech and press, in their emphasis on the
democracy and truth-promoting purposes of guaranteeing freedom of expression,
suggest that there has been much less change in how we conceive the ends the First
Amendment promotes than we conceive the means by which it does so.233 History
may therefore be helpful in uncovering what the important First Amendment
interests are, and in coming to consensus about them. Nevertheless, given the
tremendous changes in how courts have understood those purposes to be realized,
historical practice provides a very poor basis on which to determine more
specifically what kinds of expressive acts are and are not entitled to constitutional
protection, and to what degree.
The fact that courts must make judgments about the constitutional value of
speech themselves and cannot rely upon the past to do so for them is not necessarily
as much a problem for the democratic legitimacy of the First Amendment as strong
versions of the principle of content-neutrality suggest, however, and certainly as
the New Deal Court appeared to believe. Although the New Deal Court asserted
initially that low-value speech enjoyed no constitutional protection, the Court has
subsequently made clear that the government may not restrict even the lowest-value
speech (such as obscenity) in order to penalize particular viewpoints.234 Hence,
although “the government may proscribe libel . . . it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.”235
Today, as a result, the government cannot easily use the doctrine of low-value
speech to repress dissent. It can, of course, use the exception carved out for lowvalue categories such as obscenity and libel to do what the New Deal Court
announced the First Amendment prevented: namely, “prescribe what shall be
orthodox” if not in politics, nationalism, or religion, then at least when it comes to
matters of personal expression and style.236
The doctrine of low-value speech thus clearly continues to pose a problem for
the anti-normativity impulse of the modern First Amendment at least. This fact
provides only further reason to believe, however, that the Court’s continuing
reliance on a mythical view of the First Amendment’s past is a problem, insofar as
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it discourages critical engagement with the question of when and in what ways the
existing low-value exceptions pose a threat to First Amendment interests.
Of course, returning to a purpose-based approach to the delimitation of high
and low-value speech inevitably mean, as I have suggested, vest courts with
discretion to deny speech protection merely because they disliked it. But the only
alternative to granting courts this discretion would be to get rid of the distinction
between high and low-value speech altogether. Doing so, however, would have
tremendous costs of its own. It would force courts to either dilute the level of
protection afforded what is at present considered to be high-value speech in order
to allow the government to continue to regulate commercial speech, prohibit
threats, sanction criminal speech, etc., or to impose such a stringent burden on the
content-based regulation of low-value speech that it would be hard to sustain in
practice.237
Unless we are willing to return to something like the nineteenth century model
of speech regulation—a model that looks distinctly unpleasant to contemporary
eyes, precisely because of the lack of protection it affords high-value speech—
courts have no recourse but to engage in the difficult task of judging constitutional
value. Certainly what the twentieth century case law makes clear is that, while in
principle, the Court has long been committed to a conception of the First
Amendment that precludes the government from limiting expression except when
it poses a serious threat of material harm, in practice the doctrine has long
recognized broad exceptions to these rules. As Richard Fallon has noted in another
context, although “the principle of content neutrality . . . frequently is identified as
the First Amendment’s operative core, [in practice it] is neither so pervasive nor so
unyielding as is often thought.”238
The history detailed in this Article helps explain why, notwithstanding the
formal doctrinal commitment to content-neutrality, value-judgments in fact
pervade First Amendment law. Attempting to hide these judgments under the cloak
of history does not make them go away; it merely makes them harder to understand,
engage, and critique.

237
Cass Sunstein has certainly argued as much. See Sunstein, Low-Value Speech, supra note _,
at 557-58 (“It is difficult to maintain that false commercial speech, libel of private figures,
conspiracies, or child pornography ought to be immunized from governmental control-as in all
likelihood they would be if the stringent burden properly imposed on governmental efforts to
regulate political speech were extended to all categories of expression. In these circumstances, the
most likely outcome of a doctrinal refusal to look at the ‘value’ side would be that judgments about
value would be made tacitly, and the articulated rationale for decisions would not reflect an
assessment of all factors thought relevant by the courts.”).
238
Fallon, supra note _, at 2. See also Paul B. Stephan, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 206 (1982) (“Despite its repeated invocations of a near-absolute
content neutrality rule, the Court has not followed its own precept….In several cases where the
principle has seemed relevant, the Court has not considered seriously whether it applied.
Throughout, it has failed either to reconcile these results with the absolute rule it enunciated or to
describe the dimensions of the more limited rule it actually has applied.”).

59

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that, to justify what was in fact a novel distinction
between high and low-value speech, the New Deal Court asserted a continuity with
the past that did not exist. In so doing, it created a historical myth, or what we might
call an invented tradition. The term invented tradition refers to novel social
practices that are justified on the basis of an alleged, but ultimately fictitious,
continuity with the past.239 The historian Eric Hobsbawm, who coined the phrase,
noted that the “peculiarity of invented traditions is . . . [that] they are responses to
novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations.”240
As the Article shows, the doctrine of low-value speech emerged, just as
Hobsbawm suggests, in response to a novel situation: namely, the changed judicial
climate of the New Deal era and, specifically, the new constraints that the Court’s
changing conception of freedom of speech imposed on the government’s ability to
enforce basic standards of conduct in public. By identifying certain categories of
speech as entirely outside the scope of First Amendment protection, the New Deal
Court made it possible for the government to continue to punish speech—at least,
certain kinds of speech—not only when it threatened serious violence or disorder
but also when it violated dominant norms of civility, decency, and piety.
Nevertheless, in limiting the scope of First Amendment protection in this way, it
found itself in the difficult position of allowing the government to discriminate
against speech on the basis of its content, even though this was something that the
new conception of freedom of speech otherwise disavowed. To resolve this tension,
the Court invented a tradition by declaring that certain sharply delimited categories
of low-value speech had been, since 1791, beyond the sphere of constitutional
concern.
Invented traditions of this kind may be quite common in the law, given the
tremendous legitimating power that claims of historical continuity possess in a
common law legal system such as our own. As Justice Holmes remarked somewhat
critically, over a hundred years ago, “everywhere the basis of [legal] principle is
tradition.”241 This may be less true in constitutional law than it is in other areas of
the law, and less true in recent years than previously.242 Even in this context,
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however, invocations of tradition possess a great deal of power. By turning to
tradition, courts are able to fill in absences in the constitutional text, and thereby
justify a particular interpretation of what the Constitution means. 243
But in fact, history is not always continuous; times change and so do legal
understandings and the values that motivate them. Courts may therefore misuse
history by asserting a continuity with the past that does not exist in order to justify
what is in fact a new doctrinal position or understanding. The irony of the invented
tradition is that it marks change, not continuity. As Hobsbawm noted, “where the
old ways are alive, traditions need neither be revived nor invented.”244
Paying attention to when these invented traditions come into being thus may
help illuminate and identify points of significant doctrinal transformation. But, as
this Article suggests, it also should lead us to be wary of efforts to cast history as
final arbiter of constitutional meaning. Particularly in bodies of law that have
witnessed significant evolution, claims about history may reflect nothing more than
an attempt on the part of the court to avoid having to provide a more principled
justification for a new rule or interpretation, and tell us very little about the past. In
this respect, the rhetorical power that claims about history possess in the law can
undermine doctrinal development by allowing courts to avoid difficult debates
about constitutional meaning.
At least in the context of the First Amendment, what an examination of the
history of constitutional boundaries makes clear is that courts cannot avoid the
difficult task of judging the constitutional value of novel categories of speech by
turning to history. At least they cannot do so without risking the creation of a set of
doctrinal distinctions unmoored from any conception of the purposes they are
supposed to serve.
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